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Abstract 
 
Title:  Transparency of Executive Directors’ Remuneration - 
The case of Sweden 
Seminar date:  4 June 2009 
Course:  BUSM36 Degree project in Corporate and Financial 
Management, 15 ECTS 
Authors:  Sara Hagelborn, Ida-Karolina Lassesson 
Advisor:  Lars Oxelheim 
Key words:  Transparency, Remuneration, Compensation, Executive 
Director, Disclosure 
Purpose:  The purpose of this study is to analyze how transparent 
the reporting of executive directors’ remuneration is in 
Swedish listed companies, by examining to what extent 
the demand for information is satisfied by the annual 
reports. 
Methodology:  The study is divided into two parts, performed with an 
abductive approach. The first part is qualitative with 
open semi-structured interviews, and results in the 
construction of a classification system. The second part 
is a quantitative documentary study with a descriptive 
purpose.  
Theoretical framework:  The theoretical framework is based on accounting 
theory, stakeholder theory, agency theory, manage-
rialist theory and theories regarding transparency and 
confidence, as well as existing regulations and recom-
mendations. 
Empirical foundation:  The empirical foundation consists of a media review 
and nine interviews with stakeholders. Moreover, the 
annual reports of 13 companies listed on OMX 
Stockholm Large Cap have been studied.  
Conclusions:  The market for information on directors’ remuneration 
is in disequilibrium, caused by a supply deficit. 
Therefore the transparency of the disclosed directors’ 
remuneration has been found to be mediocre, since no 
company fulfills a higher level than general disclosure.  
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1 Introduction 
 
This chapter gives an introduction and background to the debate about executive 
remunerations. Following a problem discussion, the research question as well as 
the purpose of the study will be introduced to the reader. The intended target 
audience will be presented together with the delimitations of the study, and the 
chapter will end with definitions and an outline for the rest of the paper.  
 
 
1.1 Background and earlier research 
Much has been studied and written globally on the topic of executive remune-
ration and disclosure of compensation in particular. The United States with its 
Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) have for natural reasons been at 
the forefront of the discussion. Allan L. Beller from the Securities Exchange 
Commission established that all the new legal and regulatory features after Enron 
and Worldcom had improved the disclosure of executive compensation and 
resulted in more responsible corporate governance. But, he also saw a pattern of 
too opaque and unhelpful information; “disclosure that says as little as possible 
while seeking to avoid liability, rather than disclosure that seeks to inform”, “The 
keyword in the policy regarding disclosure is transparency.” (Beller 2004, p.21)   
There have been plenty of evaluations of the new SEC CD&A regulations, for 
example Cheryl de Mesa Graziano’s (2006) account of its potential impact, Sean 
M. Donahue’s (2008) article about the insufficiency of the new rules, and Gerry 
Grant’s (2008) examination of the compliance with the new requirements. Grant 
found that most companies have improved disclosures on executive compen-
sation, but still the SEC staff issues comment letters to companies with demands 
for additional information (2008, p.30). Stephen Miller (2008) observed that most 
large US companies did not intend to disclose the performance goals for their 
incentive programs, like the new rules require unless it results in competitive 
harm. The quality of disclosures was also found to vary much.     
Following rising remuneration levels, significant owner reactions to excessive 
executive pay, and a request for more executive accountability, there has been 
increased focus on disclosure of more complete information on the pay levels, 
program structure and performance criteria for key executives also in most 
European markets. (Mercer Perspective 2007, p.1, 3) 
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The topic has recently been discussed at a transnational level at the European 
Corporate Governance Forum on Director Remuneration. The main recommen-
dations emerging from the Forum in March state that disclosure of the remune-
ration policy of listed companies and of the individual remuneration of directors 
and any material change to it should be mandatory for all listed companies in the 
EU, to allow shareholders the appropriate control over compensation and the 
inherent risks. ”The disclosure should contain sufficient detail to enable share-
holders fully to understand the components of directors’ remuneration as well as 
progress towards the achievement of previously granted awards and should 
include details on pension entitlements and increases thereof and perquisites and 
other benefits in kind.” (EUCGF 2009)  
In preparation for the Roundtable Discussion, Prof. Guido Ferrarini and Dr. Maria 
Christina Ungureanu (2009) from the University of Genoa measured the extent to 
which companies in 16 European countries followed the 2004 EU Commission 
Recommendations for the presentation and disclosure of their directors’ remune-
ration policy. Disclosure practices were found to vary significantly across Europe 
but the recommendations were generally insufficiently applied, with Continental 
Europe at only 48 percent conformity. Furthermore, elements of the remuneration 
policy are scattered throughout the annual report in Continental Europe, impeding 
the assessment of the remuneration systems. Catherine Albert-Roulhac and Peter 
Breen (2005) also studied corporate governance in Europe, with the conclusion 
that the overall level of disclosure remains insufficient, especially the disclosure 
of individual compensation and compensation criteria.  
Several reports and studies have also been made by Human Resource consulting 
firms, such as Hallvarsson & Halvarsson (2008a, 2008b) and Mercer (2007). 
Hallvarsson & Halvarsson inter alia investigated how the incentive programs were 
described in the notice to the annual general meeting, and found that the public 
information about the performance requirements and risk taking could be signifi-
cantly improved, especially the transparency of incentive programs for executive 
directors (Hallvarsson & Halvarsson 2008a, p.3). Mercer investigated the key EU 
Commission Recommendations for compensation disclosures, the current disclo-
sure practices across Europe, and expected changes in practice over the coming 
years. Among the countries with medium conformance they found Germany, 
Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. In these countries, executive remune-
ration is provided only as an aggregate amount apart from the CEO which is 
specified separately. For countries at a higher level of transparency such as the 
UK, Ireland and the Netherlands, more information is required on the linkage 
between pay and performance, and more transparency about benchmarking peer 
groups. (Mercer Perspective 2007, p.1-5)        
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1.2 Swedish perspective and particularities in the 
corporate governance system 
Sweden has a hybrid corporate governance system, mixing Anglo-American 
characteristics with the governance system of Continental Europe, and is known 
for its rather high corporate transparency. (Oxelheim & Wihlborg 2008, p.14, 
184) The Anglo-American system of governance with dispersed ownership, liquid 
financial markets, active markets for corporate control, and board control, is more 
shareholder-oriented and said to have better investor protection and information 
transparency. Still, excessive executive remuneration used to be less problematic 
in Continental Europe in the past with its large controlling owners, but today 
Europe’s top paid CEOs reside all over Europe and not only in the UK. (Oxelheim 
& Wihlborg 2008, p.20)  
The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (Sw. Bolagsstyrningskoden) is much 
the same as its counterparts in other industrialized countries, but with a few 
particular features originating from the norm of concentrated ownership. There is 
a clear division of responsibilities between shareholders, the board, management 
and auditors, and shareholders are encouraged to take an active role by voting at 
annual general meetings (AGM) and working through nomination committees; the 
“ultimate power should rest with the shareholders”. (Unger 2006, p.3) This 
matters e.g. for the CEO’s ability to override the board’s decisions (see the 
managerialist theory in section 3.4).  
Sweden’s hybrid system between the one-tier and the two-tier board system 
contains a board similar to the supervisory board, elected by the annual general 
meeting. The OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm has listing rules that together 
with the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance require a majority of board 
members to be independent from the company, and two members to also be 
independent from the largest owners. Moreover, only one executive, normally the 
CEO, can sit on the board. (ECGI 2008, p.2) Another special feature is the 
presence of two or three employee representatives on the board of directors, in 
companies with at least 25 employees. A nomination committee should represent 
the shareholders and be made up of a majority of non-executive directors, often 
four or five representatives of the major shareholders. The board is to decide on 
the CEO’s remuneration after a proposal by the remuneration committee. 
Proposed guidelines and principles for executive remuneration should however be 
presented to the owners in the AGM for its approval. (Unger 2006, p.11, 17-18) 
The Code stipulates that a remuneration committee consisting of independent 
members may be set up within the board of a listed company to prepare remune-
ration matters, but the entire board apart from the CEO can also handle this and 
ultimately decide on the proposals. The board must set CEO remuneration in line 
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with the binding principles, but bonuses, profit sharing and benefits in kind can be 
decided by the board. The AGM however has to approve any share based incen-
tive scheme. Hence, shareholders have to be fully informed before the meeting. 
(ECGI 2008, p.3-5)  
These rather special features, together with the claim above that Sweden 
supposedly has a fairly high degree of transparency, makes the case of Sweden 
particularly interesting. Moreover, the debate has really blazed with several recent 
stories about excessive bonuses, overly complex incomprehensible incentive 
programs and managers with greed beyond compare.  
Earlier this year, one of Sweden’s largest banks SEB experienced a minor scandal 
after having changed its incentive program. Likely because of a complex system 
and poor transparency, it appeared as the fixed salaries for the management had 
been raised significantly and the public outcry was massive. It harmed the 
customers’ and owners’ confidence for the bank to the extent that SEB was forced 
to withdraw and reformulate the program (SEB-direktörerna avstår löneökning 
2009). Even more recent, AMF Pension came under fire when it was discovered 
that the former CEO Christer Elmehagen had received an extraordinary pension 
sum. The interesting aspect of this whole scandal was that important decision-
makers claimed that they had not received adequate information about the pension 
agreement. The board chairman Göran Tunhammar indeed described the contract 
as complex, but simultaneously argued that the annual report had been clear 
regarding the total cost to the company. (AMF:s ordförande: Årsredovisningarna 
har varit tydliga 2009)  
 
1.3 Problem discussion and research question  
Variable pay has become more frequent and in increasing amounts during the last 
decades. Therefore, incentive programs have become more and more complex, 
which may result in excessive remuneration and even manipulation. (EUCGF 
2009) The debate hitherto has mostly been whether variable pay is a good way of 
motivating executives by aligning their interest with that of shareholders, and how 
to balance the long-term incentives with short-term greed. But at the time of 
writing, the focus has somewhat shifted from the contents and appropriateness of 
the incentive programs to the disclosure and transparency of the information. 
”Increased transparency is a prerequisite for owners and the market to know about 
the existing compensation programs, and thereby form an opinion about their 
fairness.” (Jan Persson in Svidén 2009) Thus, it is not the remuneration level that 
is of concern here, but the extent of disclosure and transparency of the director 
remuneration information has become the focal point. How much relevant infor-
mation about executive remuneration is actually communicated, and is the infor-
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mation provided by companies enough to satisfy different stakeholders’ demand 
for information?  
With inadequate transparency of the incentive programs no long-term investors 
would be able to evaluate and thereby ratify the programs in the annual general 
meeting. Hence, only short-term investors would be willing to invest, reinforcing 
the problematic short-termism all too prevalent in the financial markets. Therefore 
it is of critical importance that all details of the program are known and clearly 
connected to other parts of the remuneration, and general accounts should be 
avoided as far as possible. (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2009) Corporate self-interest is 
fulfilled with more executive pay transparency, because it keeps shareholders 
activism at bay (Miller 2008, p.1). Thus, companies’ should be eager to provide 
the information that is demanded by stakeholders and shareholders in particular.   
In general, the academic research in the area has been about the conformance of 
disclosure with different regulations and recommendations. Several comparative 
studies have been made (e.g. Ferrarini & Ungureanu 2009; Albert-Roulhac & 
Breen 2005). But after thorough investigation, nothing has been found on the 
demand. Most researchers probably assume that the legal frameworks capture all 
variables that are of interest to stakeholders, but this study intends to compile the 
demand for information of different stakeholders, and then compare it with the 
information provided in the annual reports.  
The above problem discussion brings us to the following research question:  
How transparent is the reporting of executive directors’ remuneration  
in Swedish listed companies? 
However, to measure transparency in an objective manner, the study starts by 
examining what information different stakeholders demand and require for the 
accounts to qualify as adequately transparent. 
 
1.4 Purpose 
This study intends to analyze how transparent the reporting of executive directors’ 
remuneration is in Swedish listed companies, by examining to what extent the 
demand for information is satisfied by the annual reports.  
 
1.5 Delimitations and target audience 
The following study will not venture into a discussion about the reasonableness of 
the actual amounts and contents of the incentive programs, but is concerned only 
with the disclosure and transparency of information to enable well-founded 
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decision making and appraisal by stakeholders. It does neither intend to measure 
the actual amount of disclosed information, but only how supply conforms to 
demand. Lastly, only the annual reports have been examined as the source of 
remuneration information.  
The main target audience is the academic community. However, the results of the 
study could benefit not only existing shareholders and future investors, but also be 
of interest to the entire society through public confidence and trust. Not only will 
investors and creditors want to know about any misappropriation of their funds, 
but there are high indirect costs involved in insufficient reporting and transpa-
rency of remuneration. The difficulty for shareholders to judge and assess incen-
tive programs could give executives unreasonable benefits at shareholders 
expense resulting in a loss of investor confidence, especially if directors are 
awarded significant bonuses and perquisites when they are perceived of having 
influenced the decision-making process (AMN 2002:1). It is therefore in 
everyone’s interest that remuneration information is properly communicated in 
the annual reports.  
 
1.6 Definitions 
Transparency – there is no generally accepted definition of the concept of 
transparency but in this study it will be defined as the disclosure of relevant, 
reliable, comparable and understandable information that fully meets the demand 
of stakeholders.   
Executive directors – includes board members, the chairman of the board, the 
CEO and other persons in the top management. Also referred to as executives in 
short.  
Remuneration – pay or salary for services rendered.  Often consisting of fixed 
salary, short-term incentives, long–term incentives, pensions, non-cash benefits 
and severance payments.  
Bonus – this concept is widely used as all variable remuneration. However, 
according to the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise “bonus” should not be used 
in this sense, but should only denote gratuities awarded with no prior agreement 
(Svenskt Näringsliv 2006, p.13). In this study it is therefore defined as the part of 
short-term variable remuneration that is not connected to any individual 
performance agreed in advance.  
Non-cash benefits – includes all benefits regarded as remuneration such as 
company car, health insurance and accommodation. Also commonly referred to as 
perquisites.  
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Incentive program – programs designed to motivate employees with variable 
remuneration. Could include both long-term and short-term remuneration as well 
as bonuses.  
 
1.7 Disposition  
Introduction 
Empirical findings and 
analysis of study one – 
the demand for 
information 
Empirical findings and 
analysis of study two – 
the level of 
transparency 
Theoretical framework 
Methodology 
Conclusion and 
discussion 
Chapter 2 
This is where the choice of scientific approach 
will be presented as well as the method of 
collecting data. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the validity and reliability of the 
study, and some criticism of the sources.  
Chapter 3 
The theoretical framework of the study will be 
presented in this chapter including accounting 
theory, stakeholder theory, agency theory, 
managerialist theory, theories regarding 
transparency and confidence, as well as 
regulations and recommendations. 
Chapter 4 
This chapter will present the empirical findings 
from the study of demand for information, 
followed by an analysis which includes the 
creation of a classification system.  
Chapter 5  
In this chapter the empirical findings from the 
examination of annual reports will be presented 
and analyzed.  
Chapter 6  
This final chapter will present the conclusion and 
answer the research question. A further 
discussion will be held, and suggestions for 
future research will conclude the thesis. 
Chapter 1 
This chapter will give the reader an introduction 
to the subject and present the problem 
discussion, which leads to the research question 
and purpose of the study.  
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2 Methodology 
 
To give the reader an understanding of how the study has been conducted and the 
possibility to critically assess any possible research effect, this chapter will give 
an explanation of the methods of investigation. A discussion of the quality of the 
study will also be held. 
 
 
2.1 Scientific perspective and approach 
The study can be divided into two part studies. The first one is a qualitative study 
which, by studying regulations and recommendations and by interviewing 
different stakeholders, aims to define what actual information is demanded. The 
second study is a quantitative documentary study, where the supply of information 
in the annual reports is analyzed, with the demand found in the first study used as 
a basis. However, the aim is not to measure how much the companies disclose 
about remuneration, but to create an understanding of how well they live up to the 
demand of information. The study therefore has a descriptive purpose. (Bryman & 
Bell 2005, p.322) 
The study is conducted with an abductive approach. Since it is based on the 
ongoing debate about the disclosure of remuneration and uses a theoretical 
framework as a basis for what kind of information is demanded, the method 
cannot be said to be inductive. Critics to the inductive method state that it is in 
fact impossible to use a completely inductive method since the researcher in 
question will almost always have an expectation of the result (Jacobsen 2002, 
p.43). However, the method used here is neither totally deductive because it does 
not start with a predetermined theoretical framework before collecting the 
empirical data, and the aim of the study is not to confirm or reject a hypothesis 
(Bryman & Bell 2005, p.23-25). Instead the study tries to be as inductive as 
possible when examining what information is needed for a good transparency of 
remuneration. Some of this information is found in the theoretical frameworks and 
some in the empirical findings. This information is then used to create different 
levels of transparency, in an original theoretical framework on how to classify 
transparency. The study then collects empirical data which is analyzed with the 
new theoretical framework. Thus, an abductive method is used (Alvesson & 
Svenningsson 1994 p.42).  
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2.2 Collection of data 
In the beginning of the study research of secondary data was made to gain a 
deeper understanding of the topic and to see what areas had already been studied. 
Two different databases on the Internet were primarily used to find scientific 
articles; elin@lund1 and ABI Inform2, with search words such as compensation, 
remuneration, disclosure, transparency and bonus. Furthermore, a review of the 
debate in the media has been made, mainly through the two search engines 
Artikelsök3 and Affärsdata4. The sources were limited to the most well-known and 
reliable newspapers, business journals and websites; Dagens Industri, Svenska 
Dagbladet, Dagens Nyheter, Sydsvenska Dagbladet, Veckans Affärer, 
Affärsvärlden, Aktiespararna and Balans. Besides creating a deeper understanding 
of the subject, some of the articles found in the media have been used as inputs for 
defining the demand for information.  
 
2.2.1 Defining demand of information 
As a first step in defining demand of information, a compilation of the Swedish 
regulatory frameworks has been made, which includes the Annual Accounts Act 
(Sw. Årsredovisningslagen), the Companies Act (Sw. Aktiebolagslagen) and the 
Swedish Code of Corporate Governance. As the Annual Accounts Act only gives 
basic mandatory requirements for information and the Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance does not give enough specific instructions of what information to 
disclose, three other guidelines and recommendations can be found to comple-
ment these regulations. They are issued by three Swedish organizations; the 
Securities Council (Sw. Aktiemarknadsnämnden, AMN), the Confederation of 
Swedish Enterprise (Sw. Svenskt Näringsliv), and the Swedish Industry and 
Commerce Stock Exchange Committee (Sw. Näringslivets Börskommitté, NBK). 
Besides the Swedish regulations and guidelines, the EU Commission Recommen-
dations have also been observed and included in the study of demand for infor-
mation.  
Since there could be demand for information that is not captured by the 
regulations and guidelines, the public debate in the media has been reviewed and 
interviews with different stakeholders have been performed.   
                                                             
1Electronic Library Information Navigator, a database that integrates data from several publishers, 
databases and e-print open archives.  
2
 ABI Inform is a database with international working papers, periodicals and news papers within 
business and economics 
3
 Artikelsök is a database with references to articles and reviews in Swedish periodicals, available 
for students at Lund University through Elin@Lund.  
4
 Affärsdata is a database with reference to five Swedish newspapers; Dagens Nyheter, Göteborgs-
Posten, Svenska Dagbladet och Sydsvenska Dagbladet, Upsala Nya Tidning, 32 business jurnals 
and telegram from news agencies.  
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Because of the geographical distance to the respondents, the interviews have been 
made by telephone, except for two respondents that only agreed to answer the 
questions by e-mail due to a busy time schedule. The interviews have been semi-
structured, to fully allow the respondents to explain their views and thoughts, and 
open with only a few number of predetermined questions. (Bryman & Bell 2005, 
p.363) The interviewer frequently asked attendant questions to get further expla-
nations on the information demanded.  
 
2.2.2 Selection of interview respondents 
The interview respondents have been selected to represent the different stake-
holders interested in the reporting of remunerations. According to the stakeholder 
theory, there are several parties interested in the financial information given in the 
annual reports, e.g. customers, suppliers, employees, management, owners, 
creditors, the society, and interest groups (Clarke 2007, p.27-29). Current owners, 
as well as potential owners, are interested in the information for their decision of 
whether to sell, keep or buy shares. The employees want to know whether the 
company is profitable and stable, and the creditors can be assumed to use the 
information to decide if the company will be able to repay debts, interest and 
amortization. Customers want to know if the company will stay in business to 
provide them with replacement parts or additional services. The government and 
municipality use the information to regulate and determine taxes, and the society 
and interest groups want to be able to follow the company’s economic state and 
business position. (Artsberg 2003, p.167) Since the levels of remuneration can 
affect the company’s profitability and economic state in both a positive or nega-
tive manner, it should be a matter of concern for all these stakeholders.  
According to the Companies Act as well as the Code of Corporate Governance, it 
is the owners that finally decide on the remuneration principles in the annual 
general meeting. Thus, it could be argued that the disclosure of remunerations is 
of special interest to this stakeholder group, wherefore there has been a particular 
focus on representatives of this group in the search for interview respondents. The 
chiefs of corporate governance at several institutional investment funds, such as 
Folksam, AMF Pension, Första AP-fonden, Öresund, Aktiespararna and Investor, 
have been contacted by e-mail directly. Most of them declined an interview with 
the argument that they did not have time to participate. Only two of these agreed 
to do an interview; Ossian Ekdahl at Första AP-fonden and one that wishes to stay 
anonymous.  
As the ownership structure has become more and more diversified, with a large 
part of institutional investors, financial analysts have taken a more important role 
in the communication between current owners, potential investors and companies 
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(Blom et al. in Alvesson & Svenningsson 2007). Therefore, 23 analysts and chief 
analysts at 11 different banks have been contacted. Three of them replied that they 
do not look into the information about remunerations at all. Only two agreed to do 
a telephone interview and two agreed to answer the questions by mail.  
Because of the inherent difficulty in finding interview respondents for customers, 
suppliers and employees that use the information given about the remuneration in 
the annual reports, interviews have instead been conducted with consultants 
representing the total group of stakeholders. More information about the respon-
dents and the organizations can be found in the empirical findings. An interview 
has also been made with Carl-Gustaf Burén, the accounting expert at the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise. However, Burén did not give any specific 
details on what information is demanded, but simply referred to different regula-
tions and recommendations on the area as well as the propositions and reports 
behind their regulations. All the regulations and recommendations that Burén 
referred to, can be found in 3.6 Regulations and recommendations.  
Regarding the creditors, a number of credit analysts have been contacted. The 
three analysts that replied explained that they either do not use the annual report at 
all or they focus only on the balance sheet and income statement. None of them 
look at the information on remunerations at all. The demand from the society is 
covered by the regulations and recommendations and through a media review, 
which also incorporates the different public interest groups.  
 
2.2.3 Defining levels of transparency 
The annual report, which incorporates the annual account and the corporate 
governance report, is the main tool for communicating information regarding 
remunerations. (Hallvarsson & Halvarsson 2008b, p.22) Therefore, the second 
study will examine a number of annual reports to define how well the companies 
live up to the compiled information demanded.  
Since the different information that is requested, from now on called variables, 
does not weigh equally it would not be accurate to measure transparency only by 
calculating how many variables the companies fulfill. Two companies that 
disclose just as many variables may not be equally transparent because of the 
different nature of the variables they disclose. Therefore a classification system 
will be created based on the demanded variables.  
The classification system will consist of four levels, where the first level includes 
the variables that are regulated by the Annual Accounts Act. This is information 
that all companies should disclose according to legislation. To reach a higher level 
of transparency, the companies have to disclose several other variables demanded 
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by the different stakeholders. The variables given by the first study will be divided 
between level two and three depending on how firm-specific the information is. 
This is because more firm-specific information is assumed to give a higher level 
of transparency. The fourth and highest level of transparency does not require any 
additional variables but includes all the variables required on the previous levels.  
The four different levels are: 
1) Basic disclosure; the company only discloses the mandatory information given 
by the Annual Accounts Act,  
2) General disclosure; the company discloses some additional information, but 
the nature of the information is very general and many of the more specific 
variables demanded by the stakeholders are omitted,  
3) Extended disclosure; the company discloses more firm-specific information, 
but does not fully live up to all the demanded variables,  
4) Full disclosure; the company fully meets the demand of information from 
shareholders as well as regulations and recommendations.  
For a company to reach a certain level, half of the variables at that level need to be 
disclosed at the minimum. I.e. to reach level two, the companies need to fulfill 
half of the variables at level one and level two, and to reach level three half of the 
variables at level three needs to be fulfilled as well. This means that a company 
can reach level three by fulfilling half of the variables at level two and three, 
while a company that fulfills all variables at level two but none at level three will 
still be classified at level two. The motivation behind this is that the variables at 
level three give more transparency than the ones at level two. To reach the fourth 
level which implies full transparency, the companies need to disclose all 
demanded variables.  
 
2.2.4 Selection of companies  
Because of the time limit of this study it was not feasible to include all Swedish 
listed companies in the empirical research. Incentive programs and variable pay is 
more common among the largest companies (AMN 2002:1), wherefore the study 
will focus only on the largest public corporations listed at the OMX Stockholm 
Large Cap. This selection is also motivated by the fact that the blazing debate 
about too high and complex remunerations has generally concerned executive 
directors in the very largest listed companies (Svenskt Näringsliv 2006, p.5). To 
delimit the study further, and to facilitate an industry comparison, three different 
industries have been selected; Financials, Industrials and Health Care. These are 
all prominent industries in the Swedish society, and they have different characte-
ristics that can make a comparison interesting. Financial companies have been 
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particularly under fire in the debate about bonuses, and can be expected to be 
more secretive given the competitive environment. At the same time however, 
their whole business idea depends on confidence wherefore the matter of transpa-
rency should be especially relevant. The industrial sector in Sweden has always 
been a large part of the economy, and the cyclicality of the industry makes it 
interesting for comparisons. The health care industry is on the contrary not very 
cyclical, and likely attracts more long-term investors.  
On April 18th 2009 there were 57 companies on OMX Stockholm Large Cap 
whereof 13 companies have been selected by using the random selection tool in 
excel; five companies, out of a total population of 16 companies in the industrial 
sector, and five out of 12 companies in the financial sector. The health care sector 
only has four companies on the large cap list and one of them, AstraZeneca, is a 
foreign company that follows the much more detailed regulation for disclosure of 
remuneration in the United Kingdom. AstraZeneca is therefore not part of the 
study to avoid a misrepresentation of the health care sector. Also, companies that 
do not have variable remuneration have been excluded from the study, since it is 
mostly the disclosure of variable remuneration that is of concern in the discussion 
of transparency.  
Hence, the following companies were chosen:  
 
Table 3.1 List of companies 
Financials Industrials Health Care 
Hufvudstaden (HUFV) NCC Elekta (ELE) 
Investor (INV) Atlas Copco (AC) Getinge(GET) 
SEB  SCANIA (SCA) Meda (MED) 
Nordea (NOR) SKF   
Swedbank (SWE) Volvo (VOL)   
 
The latest annual report for each company has been studied, i.e. the annual report 
from 2008, except for Elekta who does not have the calendar year as their fiscal 
year. To avoid reducing the number of companies in the health care sector further, 
Elekta’s annual report for 2007/2008 has been studied.  
 
2.3 Validity and reliability  
The choice and number of interview subjects could affect the reliability of this 
study. Since only nine persons have been interviewed about the demand for 
information, it is possible that their answers do not represent the majority of the 
stakeholders. Therefore a study with different respondents could give a different 
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result of the demand for information. However, as will be shown in the empirical 
findings, several of the respondents’ answers overlap with each other as well as 
with the media and recommendations, wherefore much different answers would 
not be expected. In the same way the studied companies represent a greater popu-
lation, and even though they have been selected randomly there is a risk that they 
are not representative for all companies on OMX Stockholm Large Cap.  
Some of the regulations and recommendations leave room for different interpre-
tations, as will be discussed in the theoretical framework. This might affect both 
the validity and the reliability of the study, if the variables given in the first study 
are misinterpreted by the researchers. However, the regulations and recommen-
dations have been examined together with any existing preparatory work as well 
as other revisions, to establish the most accurate interpretation.  
To guarantee the reliability of the examination of the annual reports and minimize 
the risk of human error, all reports have been studied twice. Also, the first three 
annual reports were examined by both authors together to stipulate the exact 
interpretation of each variable as well as the information in the annual reports. 
The rest of the examinations were carried out by the same researcher. 
 
2.4 Criticism of sources 
When collecting information and data for this study mostly scientific articles, 
student literature and books have been used, but also articles from journals, 
magazines and daily newspapers. Because the scientific evidence of such articles 
can be questioned, they have mostly been used to create an understanding of the 
subject and the ongoing debate. Still, for the review of demand expressed in the 
media mostly daily newspapers and business magazines were used, but to 
maintain high reliability only statements from named and reliable stakeholders 
have been used.  
Since the annual reports is not the only way for the companies to inform its stake-
holders about their development but also a way to market itself, there is a possi-
bility that the information they disclose does not correspond to the actual remune-
rations. This study will then measure a transparency that is not true. However, this 
problem is impossible to overcome in the study without doing thorough case 
studies on each company, comparing their remunerations with the information 
disclosed in the annual reports.  
Regarding the interviews, there is a possibility that the respondents have replied 
according to what they believe is a correct answer. They might not truly request 
the information they proclaim themselves, but only be biased by the media debate. 
Even so, since it is assumed that what is discussed in media is a true indication of 
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demand, the possibility of influenced respondents does not cause any great 
problem to the investigation. Similarly, the respondents may however be biased 
by their working role and personal interests, giving rise to potential interview bias. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical framework of the study will be presented in this chapter, 
including accounting theory, stakeholder theory, agency theory, managerialist 
theory as well as theories regarding transparency and confidence. This will be 
followed by the relevant regulations and recommendations.  
 
 
3.1 Accounting theory 
The annual reports constitute the primary means of communicating with stake-
holders, and shareholders in particular. They require regular information demon-
strating that managers are accounting properly for the funds under their control. 
However, information to shareholders is normally restricted to that specified by 
statute, e.g. the Companies Act, professional regulation such as Financial 
Reporting Standards, or by market regulations such as listing requirements. Thus, 
there may be a tension between what information shareholders would like to have 
and what managers are prepared to provide of concern for business secrets or 
criticism, both in terms of quantity and quality of the information. (Elliott & 
Elliott 2006, p.3-4)    
The confidence is very much dependent not only on the actual contents of the 
information disclosed, but also on the manner in which directors’ remuneration is 
communicated. It is not necessarily only the quantity of information that causes 
troubles for investors, but also the way in which the information is portrayed and 
presented. According to accounting theory, information in the financial statements 
should have the following qualitative characteristics; relevant, reliable, under-
standable and comparable. However, improving the quality of information is far 
from simple. “In deciding which information to include in financial statements, 
when to include it and how to present it, the aim is to ensure that financial state-
ments yield information that is useful.” (ABS 1999, p.32)   
Relevance is prioritized in case the other attributes are mutually exclusive, and 
implies that the information has the ability to influence the economic decisions of 
users, either because of its confirmatory or predictive value. Reliable information 
should faithfully represent the substance of transactions, be free from deliberate 
bias and material errors, and be complete and prudent in case of inevitable judg-
ments. Furthermore, the information should be comparable and consistent, 
enabling users to evaluate events and numbers over time and across different 
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reporting entities. Lastly the information should be understandable, in the sense 
that its significance can be perceived by users that have a reasonable knowledge 
of business, economic activities and accounting, as well as willingness to study it 
with reasonable diligence. The threshold quality criterion is materiality; informa-
tion which if misstated or omitted may influence the economic decisions of users 
should be disclosed. (ASB 1999, p.32-33, 37, 42)  
There may arise conflicts between the different qualitative characteristics, forcing 
a trade-off. The most relevant information is not necessarily the most reliable, e.g. 
if there is a delay in the collection of information, making it irrelevant, but 
reporting it too early could impair the reliability whereas leaving it out would 
affect the completeness, and thus the reliability. There is also a potential conflict 
between prudence and neutrality within reliability. While neutrality implies 
freedom of bias, prudence is a potentially biased concept. Similarly, if information 
is relevant, reliable and comparable, this may result in so complex information 
that it is not understandable by all the users, even if they are assumed to have 
adequate knowledge of economic and accounting issues.  Relevant and reliable 
information should nevertheless not be excluded from the annual report only 
because it is too difficult for some users to comprehend. (ABS 1999, p.43-44)  
Regarding relevance of information, the statements are used by a variety of 
different stakeholders such as lenders, trade creditors, customers, employees, the 
government and the public which turn them into very general-purpose reports 
with a compromise between different information. It is virtually impossible to 
satisfy everyone’s needs, and all information can hardly be relevant to everyone. 
At least in the Anglo-American corporate governance system, shareholders are 
considered of primary concern since they provide the companies with funding. 
(Elliott & Elliott 2006, p.4) Countries in Continental Europe take more of a stake-
holder approach however, trying to balance the interests of all different parties.  
 
3.2 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory defines organizations as multilateral agreements between the 
enterprise and its multiple internal and external stakeholders. Employees, 
managers and owners are examples of the first-mentioned, whereas customers, 
competitors, suppliers, interest groups and the society are all external stake-
holders. (Clarke 2007, p.27-29) In the preparatory work for SOU 2004:47, the 
Government established that remuneration matters are of relevance not only for 
shareholders, but also for other stakeholders. They all want executives’ remune-
ration to be reasonable given the development of the company and the perfor-
mance of each individual. (SOU 2009:34, p.311)          
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The relationships between the company and different stakeholders are governed 
by formal and informal rules, and can both constrain and create possibilities to the 
company. Management gets funding from shareholders, but long-term employees, 
suppliers and customers also contribute firm-specific assets to the company in 
different ways. Hence, management must consider the effect of corporate 
decisions on all the firm’s stakeholders, which may result in severe difficulties to 
prioritize between different interests. The stakeholder theory is said to have 
intellectual appeal, but it is also argued that the multiple stakeholder responsi-
bilities may leave management with too much freedom of manoeuvre. (Clarke 
2007, p.27-29) 
 
3.3 Agency theory  
“To reduce the conflict of interest between absent owners and insightful CEOs, 
the linkage between pay and performance is the number one suggested remedy.” 
(Oxelheim & Wihlborg 2008, p.185)  
The essence of the agency problem arises from the separation of ownership and 
management. With dispersed shareholdings the owners can no longer exercise 
direct monitoring and controlling but have to appoint managers or agents, to 
generate returns on their funds. (Jensen & Meckling 1976 in Clarke 2007, p.23) 
Contracts have to be written and enforced, and agency costs arise from the struc-
turing, monitoring, and bonding contracts among parties with conflicting interests. 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976 in Fama & Jensen 1983, p.304) The theory assumes 
that individuals are self-interested and act to maximize their own utility. Provided 
that managers are given a considerable amount of control rights and discretionary 
power, the investors or principals will want to put constraints on managers to 
reduce the misallocation of their funds. To mitigate the agency problem, efficient 
markets in corporate control, management and information are important. (Clarke 
2007, p.24) Thus, transparent accounting of remunerations and the link between 
pay and performance works as a control mechanism. The principals want to 
receive adequate information in order to monitor the reasonableness of agents’ 
remuneration.         
Agency theory has been criticized for its simplicity and crudeness. Even though 
the main agency relation is said to exist between shareholders and the 
management, in reality there is a double agency dilemma since owners first 
appoint a board of directors, who in turn select the management to lead the 
company. The board is supposed to act as a control mechanism, mitigating any 
diverging interests between the end-principal and agent, as elaborated on below. 
(Clarke 2007, p.24)   
28 
 
3.4 Managerialist theory and board responsibility 
This theory is what commonly is referred to as the “emperor CEO”; when the 
managers get too much power relative to the board and can control the compo-
sition and decisions of the board. For example, if the CEO manages to determine 
the remuneration for senior executives including himself because of a distorted 
power balance. (Clarke 2007, p.29) A CEO that is awarding himself excessive 
amounts of remuneration would likely try and conceal this in the annual report. 
Therefore, to create confidence and understanding for the remuneration systems, it 
is necessary to openly provide clear information to the shareholders and the 
market (Svenskt Näringsliv 2006, p.16).  
Furthermore, managerial accountability should be enforced by a critical and 
questioning board of directors. The board should act in the best interest of share-
holders, but corporate governance critics argue that boards are unable or unwilling 
to monitor and control management and instead grant automatic pay increases to 
CEOs regardless of performance (Townsend 1984; Geneen 1984, in Mallette, 
Middlemist & Hopkins 1995, abstract). Thus, it is highly important to assure that 
executives do not abuse shareholders funds or confidence, by promoting an active 
role of the owners. One way is to provide shareholders with a better insight and 
understanding of the remuneration, and allow them the opportunity to discuss the 
matters. (SOU 2009:34, p.311)  
Even though the board is responsible for designing the incentive programs for 
management, they have to present the remuneration policies and principles and 
put it up for voting in the annual general meeting. The fact that incentive 
programs are nowadays ultimately ratified or rejected by the owners in the annual 
general meeting allow the company board and management to shift the responsi-
bility on to the shareholders and in so doing avoid criticism and a public outcry. It 
is thus of critical importance to provide the owners with adequate information or 
else they will vote blindly. Some argue that the AGM is nothing more than empty 
procedures, but the risk of misappropriation of assets is certainly greater the more 
ambiguous and unclear information that is reported to investors. 
 
3.5 Transparency and Confidence 
The Swedish Commission on Business Confidence (Sw. Förtroende-
kommissionen) was established in 2002 to examine the public confidence in the 
Swedish business sector and suggest remedies to a declining level of confidence. 
At that same moment a “Code Group” was founded, to work on a Swedish Code 
of Corporate Governance. There arose a realization that a lack of confidence 
could result in significantly increased transaction costs and therefore should be of 
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concern to the entire society, given the importance of public confidence to growth 
and prosperity. The study showed that deficiencies in salary and benefits systems, 
especially the high remuneration levels for senior executives with benefits 
insufficiently linked to performance, had particularly impaired the public’s 
confidence in business.  
Moreover, the lack of transparency and openness regarding directors’ remune-
ration and incentive programs resulted in difficulties of assessment and correct 
decision-making for investors. The Commission considered openness to be a 
highly suppressive factor against abnormally high remuneration, especially if 
disclosure were to be made on an individual basis as well. One of the suggested 
strategies to manage the declining confidence was thus more openness and 
transparency, with the provision of clear, intelligible, correct and relevant infor-
mation. The information provided should not be so complex that only an expert 
could understand and evaluate it. There was a reservation however, that 
companies may need to keep information confidential because of business secrets 
or integrity reasons. (SOU 2004:47, p.43-45, 47, 51, 137, 156, 226) 
Corporate scandals and economic crises have put the spotlight on deficiencies in 
the corporate governance systems, conflicts of interest, agency problems and 
moral hazard, and the importance of corporate financial transparency. But the 
concept of transparency is still not precisely defined, apart from that it has to do 
with openness and access to unambiguous information. (Oxelheim 2006, p.1-2) 
Transparency has in this thesis been thought of as the disclosure of relevant, 
reliable, comparable and understandable information that fully meets the demand 
of stakeholders.  
A suboptimal transparency can have far-reaching consequences, as agents demand 
a risk premium to compensate for the uncertainty. This increases the cost of 
capital, which results in fewer investments and ultimately a slow-down in 
economic growth. (Oxelheim 2006, Outline) Moreover, the overall propensity to 
save in e.g. corporate bonds is affected by savers’ confidence, which also relates 
to transparency. Thus, the capital allocation efficiency is at risk here as the system 
may no longer efficiently direct the financial resources to the best investments. 
The sharing of information that ideally should take place to alleviate problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection, and allow for proper evaluation of invest-
ments, may be obstructed. (Oxelheim 2006, p.9-10) Incomplete disclosure and 
poor transparency can possibly cause two other problems. If shareholders do not 
get complete, relevant and understandable information, they will not be able to 
influence the board’s decisions on executive compensation by placing own 
proposals or voting no in the annual general meeting. Further, if the true and full 
picture is not known by shareholders, media and the public, “outrage costs” i.e. 
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negative reactions to high levels of compensation may harm the company 
(Bebchuk & Fried in Donahue 2008, p.66-67, 69). 
In the case of transparent remuneration systems, it is sometimes argued that too 
much disclosed information could result in the loss of key competence, when 
competing firms know exactly what to offer executives to outbid their current 
employer. There is also a risk that more openness results in higher remuneration 
(Jan Persson in Svidén 2009), since the CEO and other executives can see what 
the competitors are offering and play the companies off against each other. When 
remuneration to executive directors is based on peer group comparison and 
especially when the company aims to be at the upper quartile of the benchmarked 
companies, there might be a “ratchet effect” – upward pressure on remuneration, 
without any connection to performance. (EUCGF 2009, p.3)  
The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise also state that disclosure of remune-
ration should not go to extremes when it comes to individuals, because of integrity 
and competitive reasons. In the United States, only about half of the companies 
were found to report the financial targets on which compensation was based 
(Watson Wyatt Worldwide 2007 in Dalton & Dalton 2008, p.90), because too 
much detail is proprietary and could result in a competitive disadvantage. Most 
countries allow exemptions from such information disclosure that could be 
problematic in this sense, but who draws the line? Several companies use the 
competitive environment as a justification for all kinds of perquisites granted to 
executives. (Dalton & Dalton 2008, p.90-91)               
However, companies apparently often make voluntary disclosure beyond 
minimum requirements, in response to market demand. This suggests that they 
understand the benefits arising from transparent information, when it comes to 
attracting capital and maintaining confidence in the capital markets. The OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance highlight the importance of disclosure and 
real transparency to facilitate market-based monitoring of companies and owners’ 
ability to influence the company policies. Owners and potential investors need 
regular, reliable, detailed and comparable information to assess the management 
and make informed decisions. Poor transparency however, may result in unethical 
behavior and a loss of market integrity, impacting the whole economy negatively. 
The cost of capital will rise and resource allocation is impaired. (OECD Principles 
2004, p.49-50) 
Thus, there seems to be a concept as “optimal transparency” from the companies’ 
perspective. Whereas improved transparency lowers uncertainty and information 
asymmetries for investors resulting in reduced cost of capital, from a business 
perspective too much transparency could put the company at a competitive 
disadvantage. It may also be excessively expensive for companies to prepare the 
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information. (Oxelheim 2006, p.18, 39 & 303) Therefore, a trade-off between cost 
advantages and the competitive risks of a high transparency could be expected.    
 
3.6 Regulations and recommendations 
The Swedish Companies Act and the Annual Accounts Act constitute the primary 
binding regulation in Sweden on the matter of directors’ regulation. Since the 1st 
of July 2006 the Companies Act contains special regulations about the decision-
making process for remuneration to board directors and executive directors in 
public limited companies, and simultaneously the section on disclosure of 
remuneration to executive directors in the Annual Accounts Act has been 
extended. The changes were a result of the work of the Commission of Trust, 
aiming to restore the confidence in Swedish companies. During this same period, 
the need for a Code of Corporate Governance was established, and the first Code 
came into force in July 2005. (SOU 2009:34, p.293-294) The Swedish Corporate 
Governance Code is nowadays applicable to all Swedish listed companies, via the 
“comply or explain” principle, but only contains very limited rules on the matter 
of remuneration and information disclosure. (ECGI 2008, p.2)  
In 1995 an association of four different Swedish self-regulation bodies was 
created, Föreningen för god sed på värdepappersmarknaden, to promote best 
practice on the stock exchange; The Securities Council, The Swedish Corporate 
Governance Board (Sw. Kollegiet för Svensk Bolagsstyrning), The Swedish 
Industry and Commerce Stock Exchange Committee and The Swedish Financial 
Reporting Board (Sw. Rådet för finansiell rapportering). Any violation of the 
regulation is handled by the OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm. There is also the 
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Sw. Finansinspektionen) that super-
vises companies and has regulations for disclosure of remuneration principals for 
credit institutions, securities companies and insurance companies. (SOU 2009:34, 
p.300) Listed companies thus have a variety of listing rules regarding remune-
ration information to follow, enforced by the stock exchange.  
There are continuously transnational organizations that put increasing demands on 
Swedish governance practices. Apart from the Swedish national regulation and 
recommendations, there are the EU Commission Recommendations and OECD’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance from 2004 that cover the matter of directors’ 
remuneration and disclosure. The EU recommendations aim to promote sound 
corporate governance by providing shareholders with more information and 
increased influence over the decision process. (SOU 2009:34, p.305-306) The 
OECD Principles more generally discuss the importance of disclosure and 
transparent information, and give few guidelines as to what to disclose. As regards 
the board and executive remuneration, the link between remuneration and 
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company performance is however of particular interest. Companies are expected 
to provide enough information to enable shareholders to assess the costs and 
benefits of incentive programs and remuneration. Lastly, OECD considers indi-
vidual disclosure of remuneration, pensions and severance agreements to be good 
practice. (OECD Principles 2004, p. 50, 52) 
The most influential frameworks when it comes to information disclosure are 
presented next.  
 
3.6.1 The Companies Act and the Annual Accounts Act  
The Companies Act (SFS 2005:551) chapter 7 §61 says that the annual general 
meeting of a listed company should decide on the principles for remuneration to 
executive directors, after a proposal prepared by the board. The principals are to 
include the weighting between fixed and variable remuneration, as well as the 
relation between performance and remuneration, main terms for bonus and incen-
tive schemes, non-cash benefits, pensions and severance pay. Thus, the principles 
should cover on what basis salary and other benefits are rewarded, but do not have 
to be expressed in absolute amounts. The main purpose should be to give share-
holders a clear and easily grasped picture of the main components of the remune-
ration policy including the maximum cost to the company in different scenarios, 
and also give them some influence over the policy. The Companies Act chapter 8 
§51 suggests that the principles include some information on estimated future out-
comes, and explain any deviations from earlier decided principles. (SOU 2009:34, 
p.295-296, 304-305) 
The Annual Accounts Act (ÅRL 1995:1554) contains directions for how to create 
and publicize the annual report, group reports and quarterly reports. The disclo-
sure of remuneration is regulated in chapter five §19-25 and some of the para-
graphs were updated in 2006. Since it does not give much detailed information, a 
quite thorough summary can be reproduced here;  
§19 only states that salaries and other remuneration shall be disclosed as well as 
social costs with pension costs specified.  
§20 states that the sum of salaries and other remuneration shall be specified for; 
board directors, the CEO and executive directors as a group, and all other 
employees as another group. Variable payments should be disclosed separated 
from fixed salary for directors, CEO and other executive directors. Further, infor-
mation about both fixed and variable remuneration shall be specified individually 
for the CEO and each board director, excluding employee representative. When 
information is given per group, the number of persons in the group should be 
specified. If the company has employees abroad, all this information should also 
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be provided separately for each country, but an exemption in chapter 7 §14 allows 
companies to skip the individual figures in these cases.   
§22 treat the disclosure of pensions and state that the total amount of pension 
costs and similar commitments shall be disclosed for board members, CEO and 
other executive directors, with information about the number of persons in each 
group. Also here, disclosure of the amounts to each board director, except 
employee representatives, and CEO shall be made.  
§23 and 24 state that the information above shall also include former board 
directors and former CEO, as well as board deputies and vice-CEO.  
§25 states that if any golden parachutes or severance payments have been agreed 
to board directors, CEO or others in the management, these should be disclosed 
with the most essential terms.  
As can be noted, the regulation does not demand much more than certain figures 
that shall be disclosed for some important people. The amendment in chapter five 
in 2006 was intended to clarify and strengthen the owners’ power in determining 
the remunerations, and to improve the disclosure and information given about the 
executive directors’ remunerations (FAR SRS 2008). The main changes were the 
definition of executive directors which now also includes other directors than just 
the CEO and board directors, the remuneration report for the combined group now 
has to disclose the total sums of both the parent company and all subsidiaries, and 
the individual amounts now has to be disclosed not only for current but also 
former board directors, former CEO, as well as board deputies and vice CEO. 
(Janzon, Törning & Arnell 2008) 
However, the new regulation has been criticized for not being clear enough. Who 
is included in “executive directors” exactly? Moreover, there is no clear definition 
of former and vice board directors and CEO in §23. Depending on if §20 and §22 
are interpreted to have an individual perspective where those once part of the 
group always stay part of the group, or a function perspective, §23 could include 
all former employees that once have been subject to the disclosure. This might 
entail hundreds of people. It is more reasonable that former should be interpreted 
as only persons that have had a function during the current year. (FAR SRS 2008) 
Janzon, Törning & Arnell (2008) argue that it should be interpreted as people that 
have resigned during the current financial year only. What is more, the require-
ment to account for all executive directors in all subsidiaries around the world in 
§20, could potentially result in thousands of people, even if the disclosure obli-
gation is not on an individual basis. The companies still have to do the cumber-
some and costly work of collecting individual information and aggregating it for 
all CEOs, board directors and executive directors in the group, and Janzon, 
Törning & Arnell question the informational value to investors. They argue for a 
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clarification of the paragraph, and the interpretation that the total remuneration 
from all the group companies should be disclosed for the executive directors in 
the parent company only. 
 
3.6.2 Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 
The Swedish Corporate Governance Board issued a proposal for a Swedish Code 
of Corporate Governance (The Code) as late as 2004 and in 2008 a revised code 
came into force. (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 2008, p.3) Most 
corporate governance practices were however already in use after the Kreuger 
crash 1932 even if no comprehensive code had been formulated. (Carlsson 2007, 
p.1047) Some issues covered by corporate governance codes in other markets are 
governed by statute and are therefore not reiterated in the Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance. (Unger 2006, p.3) Whereas the first version was aimed 
only at large listed companies, the current revised code requires all Swedish 
companies whose shares are listed on a regulated market in Sweden, regardless of 
size, to apply the Code. (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 2008, p. 5)  
The Corporate Governance Board works to promote good governance practices in 
listed companies in Sweden, and has the main responsibility to administer the 
Code. The board has no supervisory mandate to enforce the application of the 
Code, but works together with the Securities Council and the stock exchange 
when it comes to interpretation, enforcement and sanctions. Ultimately, it is for 
the actors in the capital market to judge how well companies apply the Code, and 
act accordingly. (SOU 2009:34, p.301) 
The Code is one part of the self-regulation system, and complements the 
Companies Act and other binding regulation by extending the minimum require-
ments of governance to a higher level of best practice. This improves the public 
confidence in companies, facilitates the raising of finance, and ultimately 
improves the efficiency and growth in the Swedish economy. (SOU 2009:34, 
p.303) Like most other governance codes, it works through the “comply or 
explain” principle; compliance is not mandatory but in case of deviation this has 
to be declared and explained. This is to allow some flexibility to the diverse range 
of companies, since ultimately the investors can form their own opinion about the 
appropriateness of the companies’ solutions and invest accordingly. (Swedish 
Code of Corporate Governance 2008, p. 5-7)  
Even if the Code intends to go above the minimum levels of disclosure and it does 
contain some more requirements of what information should be available to 
shareholders before the AGM, the paragraphs actually do not mention the annual 
report at all but only requires the information to be available on the company 
website. (ECGI 2008, p.3). Furthermore, as discussed already it is not mandatory 
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to comply, as long as it is explained. But, there are no sanctions in cases when 
deviations from the Code have not been explained, and no guidelines to follow to 
judge whether an explanation is adequate or not. The system expects the market 
and investors to be the judges of this. (SOU 2009:34, p.304) Thus, the Code can 
be criticized for being rather weak, especially in its enforcement. The relevant 
guidelines on the reporting of executive management remuneration state: 
“§9 The board is to have formal and clearly stated processes for 
deciding on remunerations to members of the executive management,”5   
“§9.2 The shareholders’ meeting is to decide on all share- and share-
price-related incentive schemes for the executive management. Members 
of the board are not to participate in share and share-price related in-
centive schemes designed for executive management or other employees 
of the company. If such a scheme is designed solely for the board, it must 
be approved by the shareholders’ meeting. The decision of the share-
holders’ meeting is to include all the principle terms of the scheme.  
Background material and documentation pertaining to the proposed 
scheme is to be made available to shareholders in good time before the 
shareholders’ meeting. The material is to be clear and simple enough to 
allow shareholders to form an opinion on the reasons for the scheme, the 
principle terms of the scheme and any dilution of the share capital that 
may result from it, as well as the total cost to the company of different 
conceivable outcomes” (Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 2008, 
p.21-22). 
 
3.6.3 The Securities Council 2002:1 
The Securities Council, a private self-regulation body, has issued statements about 
the decision-making, information and content of incentive programs. Even if the 
Council has no sanction possibilities, the statements can be enforced by the stock 
exchange’s listing agreements and therefore become binding as well. (ECGI 2008, 
p.2) The statement recommends public companies to disclose additional infor-
mation about incentive schemes in the annual report, such as an explanation of the 
outcomes during the financial year from new and old programs. (SOU 2009:34, 
p.301) The Securities Council further demands that share based incentive schemes 
are reported in the annual report, that events during the recent fiscal year for all 
incentive schemes are reported, and that an overall view of current programs are 
provided. (ECGI 2008, p.3) 
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3.6.4 The Swedish Industry and Commerce Stock Exchange 
Committee 
The Swedish Industry and Commerce Stock Exchange Committee (NBK) works 
to improve best practice in the Swedish stock market by issuing recommendations 
on different matters. (SOU 2004:47 Appendix 10, p.297) The document on 
executive directors’ remuneration from 2002 gives detailed rules for mandatory 
information about benefits in the annual report, and it has been incorporated as a 
binding appendix to the listing rules. (ECGI 2003, p.2-3) Since the 1st of July 
2006, there is an updated version of the Annual Accounts Act regarding decision-
making and disclosed information about directors’ remuneration. Consequently, 
the NBK rules on the matter have been abolished. However, they continue to be 
enforced in the exchange listing agreements and have therefore been considered 
as legally binding still. (Svenskt Näringsliv 2006, p.6)  
NBK require listed companies to disclose directors’ remuneration and benefits in 
the annual report, and if the company is part of a group the remuneration from all 
companies, whether Swedish or foreign, should be included. (ECGI 2003, p.3) 
The principles for remuneration of executives, e.g. the proportion of fixed and 
variable remuneration, should be explained. For the board chairman, the non-
executive board members, the group CEO and the managing director, NBK 
require disclosure of the total amount of all remuneration and other benefits, as 
well as each remuneration item of more than minor importance, the fixed and 
variable components including major assumptions for the calculation of variable 
remuneration, holdings of financial instruments and other options received during 
the year and during previous years, and the most important terms of pension 
agreements or severance payments.  
The financial instruments received during the year should be disclosed with 
respect to holding, estimated market value at the allotment date and the acqui-
sition price for the instruments. It should also be clear whether they are offered at 
a discount. For board directors who have received additional remuneration apart 
from the board fee, the amount and the nature of the duties should be reported. 
Regarding pensions, the pensionable age and the period during which pension is 
to be paid are some of the terms to disclose. Moreover, it should be clear if 
variable remuneration constitute pensionable income, whether pension is based on 
contributions or benefits, and the cost for the year. If benefits-based pension, the 
pension level in relation to pensionable remuneration should be reported. It is also 
required to state whether the pension is revocable or not, i.e. whether the pension 
is contingent on future employment. (ECGI 2003, p.4-5)  
Regarding severance payments, the prerequisites for a benefit must be disclosed 
for each executive concerned, in particular if it can be personally requested. 
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Further, there should be information on the preparatory and decision-making 
process for directors’ remuneration, whether a compensation committee has been 
appointed and its mandate and composition. Lastly, any significant changes in the 
remuneration during the current year or from earlier information should be 
reported in the next report and made public. (ECGI 2003, p.6) 
 
3.6.5 The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise Recommendations  
The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise issued guidelines regarding remune-
ration to the CEO and executive directors in 2004, revised in 2006, to help 
companies create understanding and confidence with the shareholders and the 
public. They point out that remuneration is a matter for the owners to decide on, 
but emphasize the importance of openness of information to enable assessment, 
clear and justified terms, along with independent decision-making. The guidelines 
treat the role of the board and the annual general meeting, the contents of 
incentive programs, pensions and severance agreements, board remuneration and 
finally the information disclosure. It states that the board should give adequate 
account for the remuneration policy and paid out benefits in the annual report. 
(Svenskt Näringsliv 2006, p.4, 6)  
The benefits should be principally described and the total cost over time possible 
to value in full. Other interesting information to provide could be the purpose of 
the variable remuneration, whether the performance targets lie within the execu-
tives’ area of responsibility, what persons that are part of different programs, what 
time perspective there is and when remuneration is to be paid out, the weighting 
between fixed salary and variable remuneration, how performance is measured 
and evaluated etc. There should be a clear connection between targets and the 
individual’s performance, i.e. variables should lie within their area of responsi-
bility. For pensions based on benefits the pension level, pensionable age and 
pensionable remuneration should be accounted, and whether the pension is 
revocable or not. For contributions based pensions, the size of the premium and an 
explanation of its calculation is demanded. The true costs related to pensions 
should be calculated and accounted for. (Svenskt Näringsliv 2006, p.12-14)  
 
3.6.6 EU Commission Recommendations 
The EU recommendations are not binding for member states, but they are 
intended to act as a guideline for national regulations, via legislation or self-
regulation. Nevertheless, several member states have exceeded the recommen-
dations and imposed binding rules about disclosure for all executive directors on 
an individual basis, and the openness is good in general. What is lacking however 
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is transparency when it comes to the principles of remuneration, and in only a few 
countries including Sweden, the AGM decide on the principles by voting. (SOU 
2009:34, p.307) Several member states have however strengthened their 
legislation or self-regulation on remuneration issues, or plan to do it before long. 
The debate in EU has mostly concerned the increasing gap between the remune-
ration to normal employees and the top executives, the far too weak link between 
remuneration and performance and the company’s long term development, as well 
as shareholders’ ability to influence and control the remuneration levels. In March 
2009 the EU Commission declared its intention to sharpen the 2004 recommen-
dations shortly, as well as publish a separate recommendation for the financial 
industry. (SOU 2009:34, p.308)      
Unlike the Annual Accounts Act and the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance, 
the EU commission recommendations include more specified details on what 
information should be disclosed. The recommendation itself stresses that “it is 
important that listed companies display appropriate transparency in dealings with 
investors, so as to enable them to express their views”. “Shareholders should be 
provided with a clear and comprehensive overview of the company's remuneration 
policy. Such disclosure would enable shareholders to assess a company's approach 
to remuneration and strengthen a company's accountability to shareholders.” 
(EC/913/2004, p.55) However, it also points out that it should not oblige them to 
disclose information that is of commercially sensitive nature which could damage 
the company’s strategic position.  
The recommendation further states that, to be able to appreciate the remunerations 
in the light of the overall performance of the company, the shareholders should be 
provided with information on the individual directors of the company as well as 
executive and non-executive or supervisory directors. Adequate transparency 
about the policies regarding directors’ remuneration should also be given, which 
includes information about notice periods and termination payments. A definition 
of director is given as “any member of the administrative, managerial or supervi-
sory bodies of a listed company”. (EC/913/2004, p.56)  
All information should be disclosed in an independent remuneration report and/or 
be included in the annual accounts, as well as on the company’s website. It should 
mainly focus on the company’s policy on directors’ remuneration for the 
following year but if appropriate, even the previous years, and any significant 
changes in the policy as compared to previous financial year should be disclosed. 
The list of what information should be included in the remuneration report is four 
pages long and all items will not be enumerated here, but an extraction is given to 
give an understanding of what kind of information is required.  
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At least the following information should be set out:  “(a) explanation of the 
relative importance of the variable and non-variable components of directors' 
remuneration; (b) sufficient information on the performance criteria on which any 
entitlement to share options, shares or variable components of remuneration is 
based; (c) sufficient information on the linkage between remuneration and 
performance; (d) the main parameters and rationale for any annual bonus scheme 
and any other non-cash benefits; (e) a description of the main characteristics of 
supplementary pension or early retirement schemes for directors”. (EC/913/2004, 
p.57) 
“The remuneration statement should also summarize and explain the listed 
company's policy with regard to the terms of the contracts of executive directors”. 
“Information concerning the preparatory and decision-making process used for 
determining the listed company's remuneration policy for directors should also be 
disclosed”. (EC/913/2004, p.57) 
The recommendation also states that the total remuneration and other benefits 
given to each individual director, who has served as a director during the relevant 
financial year, should be disclosed in detail in the annual accounts or in the notes 
to the annual accounts. The reasons for why any remuneration is paid in the form 
of profit sharing or bonus payments shall be explained. The total estimated value 
of all non-cash benefits considered as remuneration shall be disclosed as well as 
compensation paid to or receivable by former executive director in connection 
with the termination of his activities during that financial year.  
There is also more detailed information regarding shares, option programs and 
other share-incentive schemes saying that following information should be 
disclosed: “(a) the number of share options offered or shares granted by the 
company during the relevant financial year and their conditions of application; (b) 
the number of share options exercised during the relevant financial year and, for 
each of them, the number of shares involved and the exercise price or the value of 
the interest in the share incentive scheme at the end of the financial year; (c) the 
number of share options unexercised at the end of the financial year; their exercise 
price, the exercise date and the main conditions for the exercise of the rights; (d) 
any change in the terms and conditions of existing share options occurring during 
the financial year”. (EC/913/2004, p.58)  
As can be seen, the EU Commission Recommendations is focusing more on the 
policies and motives behind the remunerations and information that is needed to 
evaluate the costs and effects of the share incentive schemes.  
 
  
40 
 
  
41 
 
4  Empirical findings and analysis of 
study one - the demand for information 
 
In this chapter the empirical findings from the study of demand for information 
will be presented. It will start with the review of demand expressed in the media. 
Subsequently, the answers from the interview respondents will be presented one 
by one. The chapter will end with an analysis of the empirical findings which 
includes the creation of the classification system.  
 
 
4.1 Discussion in media 
After several scandals and increasingly indignant investors, institutional funds and 
pension funds have raised their demands on the structure and disclosure of incen-
tive programs. Several of the people responsible for corporate governance in these 
funds have expressed their views on the matter in media recently.  
The recent debate about remuneration programs have caused embarrassed 
executive directors, as well as angry and disappointed customers. The confidence 
for banks and fund trustees has fallen. But Carina Lundberg-Markow, chief of 
corporate governance at Folksam – one of Sweden’s largest insurance and pension 
companies, argues that if the public debate results in more openness it is worth the 
hassle. The bonus and incentive systems, including the targets connected to 
payouts, are extremely complex. Lundberg-Markow is missing a clear connection 
between the remuneration outcomes, and a positive company result as well as 
individual performance. Folksam urge all banks and pension funds to openly 
disclose all existing remuneration systems and what purpose they serve to 
customers, owners and the public. There are plenty of benefits from increased 
openness; customers and investors can choose the company whose remuneration 
values and policies they support, and the companies can avoid embarrassing 
unmasking and scandals. (Lundberg-Markow 2009)  
Helena Levander, CEO of Nordic Investor Services, claims that the remuneration 
accounts of Swedish listed companies are often insufficient, vague and full of 
empty phrases. The purpose of the remuneration policy is frequently lacking or 
the description is ambiguous, according to a study made by Nordic Investor 
Services. The companies moreover often fail to account for how many of the 
existing contracts that diverge from the declared remuneration policy. There is 
almost always a reservation allowing the board to deviate from the guiding 
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principles, which is debatable. Levander further would like to see more clarity 
about what exact achievement that is required for variable remuneration, and 
where the ceiling kicks in. The formulation of achievements is often only given in 
very general terms, such as “related to the company’s result” or “measurable 
within the individuals’ area of responsibility”. In addition, it should be clear 
whether variable pay work as pensionable income, how many employees that still 
have a defined-benefit pension, and some indication of what it may come to cost 
the company. Frequently, the description about pension systems is limited to 
“pensions can be based on contribution, benefits or a combination”. (Palutko 
Macéus 2009)  
Första AP-fonden, one of Sweden’s main pension administrators, just recently 
released new owner policies with higher demands on the disclosure of remune-
ration information. They request a clear and measurable achievement for 
individuals in order to be awarded a payment, which further should be related to 
the company’s profitability i.e. considering also the costs of producing the profit, 
and clearly communicated to shareholders. Moreover, the cost of the program 
including potential share dilution should be clearly accounted for. (Första AP-
fonden) Not to forget, the purpose of the incentive program should be declared, as 
well as the means of evaluating it (Sidea 2009). 
The Swedish Shareholders' Association (Sw. Aktiespararna) also requests clear 
performance criteria and explicit follow-up and thorough evaluation of the 
remuneration programs, as well as a ceiling for the maximum outcome on the 
variable parts. There should be a clear connection to the company’s development, 
and a plain account of the purpose and motive of the incentive program. (Olsson 
2009a; Sidea 2009; Aktiespararna tar ton mot bonusar 2009) In an article in 
Dagens Industri Carl Rosén, head of corporate governance at Andra AP-fonden, 
Elisabeth Tandan at Aktiespararna and Annika Andersson, head of corporate 
governance at Fjärde AP-fonden, also point out the importance of separate 
disclosure of fixed and variable remuneration. (Svensson 2008). 
All details of the programs should be known and clearly connected to other parts 
of the remuneration. According to the Code, the programs should be presented in 
a way so shareholders can estimate the costs for the company in different scena-
rios. It would be ideal if companies disclosed exactly how much the CEO and 
executive management may come to earn if the programs vest under the period, 
but at this time no listed company does this. (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2009)  
The demand expressed in the media can be summarized as in table 4.1 below. 
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Table 4.1 Information demanded in the media 
* More company-specific explanations 
* The connection between bonus payouts and the company’s development 
* Clearly disclosed performance criteria 
* The exact achievement required 
* A thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of the program 
* The purpose of the incentive program  
* If there is a ceiling on the variable remuneration 
* Whether variable pay work as pensionable income 
* How many employees that still have a defined-benefit pension,  and some 
indication of what it may come to cost the company 
* The reason for why remuneration is paid in the form of variable remuneration 
* Any dilution of share capital  
 
4.2 Demand derived from interviews 
 
4.2.1 Respondent A – Anonymous 
This respondent requested to stay anonymous. He/she has more than 20 years of 
experience as an analyst, responsible for several analyst teams in large banks with 
a focus on Health Care companies. The respondent has also worked as a columnist 
in a well reputed newspaper and at a website for investors.  
First of all, the respondent points out that the information needs to be more 
specific. Since the remuneration systems have become very complex and hard to 
understand, it is essential that they are explained step by step. It is not only the 
total sum that is of interest but the different parts of the remuneration system as 
well. If the variable remuneration is based on performance criteria, these should 
be specified together with the specific targets required. The respondent says that 
this kind of information currently is not always disclosed. Moreover, even if some 
companies do specify the specific targets for their long-term remuneration, often 
share-based, they rarely do it for the short-term remuneration. In addition, in cases 
where targets are relative to peer groups, the benchmark companies or indices 
should be specified.  
Furthermore, the respondent argues that information on an individual basis should 
not only be disclosed for the CEO but also for other executive directors. It should 
be possible to assess the cost of the remuneration to different executive directors, 
and what different remuneration programs they take part in.  
The respondent also says that it can be a bit confusing where to find the infor-
mation, since you have to search for it in different places. It would therefore be 
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more convenient if all the information were gathered in one place in the annual 
report.  
 
4.2.2 Respondent B – Ossian Ekdahl 
Ossian Ekdahl is chief of corporate governance at Första AP-fonden, one of 
Sweden’s largest pension funds that is assigned to manage the pension capital of 
the Swedish people. Their primary task is to maximize the long-term return on 
investment with a low level of risk6. Ekdahl has also been head of portfolio 
strategy at Första AP-fonden, head of the analysis group at the central bank of 
Sweden (Sw. Sveriges Riksbank) and head of Section at the Ministry of Finance. 
One of his assignments at Första AP-fonden is to pursue the matter of remune-
ration in the portfolio companies, and he has publicly commented on remune-
ration programs several times (Sidea 2009; Blomberg 2008).  
Ekdahl says that the most interesting information regarding remunerations is an 
explanation of the long-term incentive programs. First and foremost, he wants to 
know the total costs and outcomes of the programs, which includes not only the 
costs for the company but also for the shareholders in terms of share dilution. This 
information is often given, perhaps not in much detail but sufficient for stake-
holders to make an adequate judgment of the remunerations, Ekdahl says. 
Furthermore, he is particularly interested in the performance criteria; the specific 
variables that are used to measure performance. It is not sufficient to write that the 
remuneration is linked to different key performance indicators without specifying 
which these are. If, for example, the measured variables are return on investment 
(ROI), earnings per share (EPS), economic value added (EVA), maximum waiting 
time for customers or other similar measures, these should be disclosed. Also, the 
target levels of the variables should be clearly disclosed. E.g. if the variable is 
ROI, the actual percentage required for the remuneration to be paid out should be 
stated. Ekdahl however explains that this could be sensitive information to 
disclose, as it gives the competitors information about the company’s targets for 
development.   
Overall, Ekdahl and Första AP-fonden request more company-specific infor-
mation and less standard wording. The company should motivate why the 
remuneration systems would benefit the shareholders. Ekdahl argues that it is not 
enough to say that incentive programs are utilized in order to attract and retain the 
executives in the management group. A proper explanation should contain why 
the specific company use complex incentive programs instead of motivating and 
remunerating executives and employees in other ways, e.g. by offering a higher 
fixed salary. Further, the companies should make evaluations of the effectiveness 
                                                             
6
 Första AP-fonden website; http://www.ap1.se/en/Our-mission/ 
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of the programs annually, to analyze if and how the remuneration systems really 
make the company perform better. The conclusion of this evaluation should then 
be disclosed.   
Even though Ekdahl says that investors need more specific information to be able 
to evaluate the remunerations, he understands why the companies do not reveal 
everything given the competitive environment. Första AP-fonden holds the 
opinion that there should be a clear distinction between the responsibilities of the 
board and the shareholders. It is the duty of the board to decide on directors’ 
remuneration and then the shareholders essentially only have to decide whether 
the board has done a satisfactory job or not. According to Första AP-fonden this 
relationship should be maintained, and it affects what information the owners 
demand.  
Therefore, Ekdahl considers the information to be sufficient in general, even 
though a few pieces are missing. He agrees that it is sometimes hard to find the 
relevant information since it is placed in different parts of the annual reports, but 
as an experienced reader one learns where to look and how to interpret the expla-
nations, he concludes.   
 
4.2.3 Respondent C – Gabriel Thulin 
Gabriel Thulin is a senior partner at Hallvarsson & Halvarsson (H&H), a 
consulting firm that helps companies create value by improving their communi-
cation and thereby create a better understanding and confidence with the stake-
holders.7 They have also conducted numerous surveys for national and interna-
tional companies and organizations, several on the subject of remuneration. H&H 
often help companies put together their annual report and pursue a greater 
disclosure on remuneration. However, Thulin says that most companies are 
unwilling to disclose more information and no one wants to take the lead in giving 
out more, possibly sensitive, information. Thulin also believes that some 
companies purposely withhold information about the remunerations and therefore 
end up in media. Apart from his work on the matter of remuneration in H&H, 
Thulin has also worked as a journalist at the financial magazine Veckans Affärer. 
With this background, he says that he knows a lot about what information the 
shareholders and other stakeholders demand.  
First of all, Thulin thinks that all the information about remuneration should be 
found in one place, preferably in a separate remuneration report, and the infor-
mation should be presented in tables as far as possible. It should be easy to find 
and not concealed in an obscure note, nor repeated in several places. It would also 
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 Hallvarsson & Halvarsson website; http://www.halvarsson.se/ 
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be useful to get information about earlier years’ remuneration for comparison. 
When it comes to desirable information, he says that there is much more infor-
mation to be requested about how the remuneration systems are designed, espe-
cially about variable remuneration to the CEO and executive directors. There 
should be a clear connection between the performance and the remuneration, with 
disclosure of the specific measures used to decide the payment as well as the 
actual targets. In addition, this information should be given for all kinds of 
remuneration. Thulin further would like to know if there is a ceiling to the 
payments.  
For self-evident reasons, he wants to know the total payments but also how these 
are connected to the company’s development and the business cycle. This is often 
raised in the media, and Thulin says that the reason is that sometimes the time 
perspective of the remunerations is not properly explained. It is not always clear 
during what financial year the performance was achieved. As an example, he says 
that the payments we read about in 2009, disclosed in the annual report for 2008, 
are often payments related to performance in 2007. Therefore he requests an 
explanation about which period the performance was achieved.  
It is also important to get information on the decision process behind the remune-
rations. Who decides the remuneration for the CEO and the board? Is there a 
remuneration committee or have any external consultants been used?   
When it comes to the disclosure of pensions, Thulin says that there is often a lack 
of information especially for people that receive defined-benefit pensions. If the 
company has not made enough contributions to future pension payments during 
the employees' service, the additional cost for the company could be very high 
when these employees retire. Therefore, it would be desirable to know how many 
employees that still have a defined-benefits based pension, and some indication of 
what it may come to cost the company.  
 
4.2.4 Respondent D – Albin Rännar 
Albin Rännar is the Operative Director at Nordic Investor Service, a company that 
offers information, analysis and services on corporate governance-related issues. 
Their goal is to help companies and institutional owners improve their corporate 
governance. Rännar has specialized in the area of incentive programs, where he 
has worked for seven years. Rännar is also a senior analyst and he was earlier 
employed as a financial analyst at Swedbank. He has also worked in the corporate 
finance department at Orkla Securities, and as the Vice President and co-founder 
of a Swiss venture capital firm called Catey8.  
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 Nordic Investor Services website; http://www.nordicinvestorservices.se/   
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Overall, Rännar thinks that the disclosure of remuneration is extremely poor, 
especially the disclosure of long-term share option programs. He requests better 
disclosure of the connection between performance and remuneration. Sometimes 
only the proportion of variable remuneration to fixed remuneration is given, with 
no information about the underlying performance. These performance criteria 
should be disclosed, he says. Rännar adds however that it is understandable why 
the companies conceal some of this information, because either they want to 
protect private integrity e.g. if employees get an expensive private car, home care 
or paid education for their kids, or it could be sensitive information on company 
targets that affects their competitiveness. Further, even though some large owners 
hold the opinion that the question on remuneration is for the board to decide and 
no excessive information should be revealed because of its sensitivity, Rännar 
argues that other owners still have the right to be adequately informed.  
According to Rännar, there is a demand for individual disclosure of each 
executive director’s remuneration, at least the five highest paid. Regarding the 
different programs, one would like to know how many persons that take part and 
what year they derive from. In particular, it is interesting to see what programs the 
CEO and executive directors take part in. If the company uses option programs 
there is a lot of information to request, e.g. how many options are offered, what 
year they originate, the exercise price and exercise date, if there is a ceiling, and if 
there is any dilution of the share capital. The performance criteria for receiving 
options or any other remuneration should also be specified together with the 
targets, and how the options are distributed if only parts of the targets are reached 
(i.e. if linear distribution or another method is used). Investors would also want to 
know how the option valuation is made, e.g. the Black & Scholes option pricing 
model, and the assumed parameters such as the volatility.   
Rännar points out the difficulty of understanding the time perspective; if the cost 
relates to paid-out remuneration or if it is remuneration earned during the year. 
Furthermore, he says that it would be better to find all information about the 
remunerations in one place, and the total costs of the board should be disclosed 
including attendant costs. He also mentions that when it comes to pensions, it 
would be interesting to know how much of the costs that belong to the current 
CEO and executives, and how much that are costs to former CEO and executives.  
 
4.2.5 Respondent E – Tomas Ullman 
Tomas Ullman works as an equity analyst at Erik Penser Bankaktiebolag and he 
has been an analyst for seven years. Currently, he is focused on banks and he 
regularly follows SEB and Swedbank among others.  
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As an analyst, Ullman is more concerned about the total costs in the company. 
Thus, he does not focus much on the remunerations apart from the total cost for 
all employees. Since this information is often given in the income statement as 
well as in a note, Ullman says that he gets all the information he needs for his 
analysis.  
Even though Ullman does not look into any specific information about the 
remunerations in general, he occasionally tries to understand the development of 
the remunerations in a company over time. He says that companies could be better 
at motivating the remunerations and the connection with the company develop-
ment, but overall he thinks that the disclosed information is sufficient. Especially 
the large companies give a very transparent disclosure on remunerations, he 
declares.    
 
4.2.6 Respondent F – Magnus Dalhammar 
Magnus Dalhammar is an equity analyst at Handelsbanken, focused on investment 
companies.  
Dalhammar neither looks much into the information about remunerations. He 
follows the media to see if anything is highlighted about the companies and tries 
to follow the development to see if anything abnormal occurs. However, some of 
the international investors are more interested in the remunerations and ask for 
more information. Dalhammar himself looks primarily for the total amount of 
remunerations and how many in the top management and among other employees 
that take part of the variable remuneration systems. He would like to see presented 
any changes in the programs from year to year, e.g. if the terms of the programs 
have been changed or if new programs have been started, but also how the total 
cost has changed from year to year. Furthermore, he would like to know on what 
basis the remuneration is paid out. However, he is not requesting any specific 
parameters, but more a general account for how the performance is measured.   
In sum, Dalhammar thinks that he gets all the information that he needs about 
remunerations in the annual report, and that the accounting is transparent. Today, 
he works exclusively with equity analysis but he has formerly worked as a credit 
analyst as well. There, he focused mainly on the balance sheet and income state-
ment, and did not look into the information about remunerations at all. 
 
4.2.7 Respondent G and H – David Halldén and Anders Hansson 
David Halldén has 12 years of professional experience and is today a chief 
financial analyst at HQ Bank. He focuses mainly on investment companies and 
companies within telecommunication services. Anders Hansson is an equity 
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analyst at Danske Bank with eight years of work experience. He focuses on retail 
and consumer goods.  
Since Halldén and Hansson did not have time to take part in a telephone 
interview, they instead answered a couple of questions by e-mail. Without the 
possibility to elaborate or make attendant questions, the respondents did not give 
any specification about what information they need for their analysis, and their 
answers were pretty short.  
Halldén however argues that the information he gets today is overall sufficient, 
even if it is still a little bit weak and not fully transparent. Apart from the total 
cost, he would like to know the specific performance criteria for variable remune-
ration to be paid out. He also says that he frequently finds factual errors and care-
less mistakes, and sometimes the companies seem to conceal information out of 
tactical reasons. Hansson on the other hand thinks that the information given 
today is fully sufficient for his analysis, and he argues that the current disclosure 
is fully transparent. He mostly uses the information about board remuneration and 
option programs.  
 
4.2.8 Summary of demand from interview respondents 
As can be seen, a lot of the information requested by the different interview 
respondents overlap. For example, most of the respondents specifically ask for 
disclosure of the performance criteria and an explanation of the target 
achievement required. Four respondents say that it would be desirable to find the 
information in one place, and they wish to see the connection between paid out 
remuneration and the company’s development. A few mention the time perspec-
tive and would like to see an explanation of what year the performance was 
achieved, as well as historical numbers for comparison. In addition, they request 
information about whether there is a ceiling on the variable remuneration, and 
how many people that takes part of the programs. 
The interview respondents together point out 25 variables that they wish would be 
disclosed. These are compiled in table 4.2 below and have all been used in the 
study of the annual reports, except for the last three which are either too general or 
not possible to check for.  
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Table 4.2 Information demanded by the interview respondents 
* Total cost of the program 
* Number of persons that take part of the program 
* Any changes in the program from previous year 
* Specified performance criteria 
* The target achievement required  
* Thorough motivation for why the company needs to have variable 
remuneration 
* Thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of the program 
* Any benchmark companies or indexes 
* Individual information for the CEO and each executive directors 
* Historical numbers for comparison 
* If there is a ceiling on the variable remuneration 
* The connection between paid out remuneration and the company’s 
development 
* Explanation of what year the performance was achieved 
* Information concerning the decision-making process 
* How many employees that still have a defined-benefit based pension, 
and what it may come to cost the company 
* Specification of what program the CEO and executive directors have 
* How many options that are offered,  what year they originate, the 
exercise price and exercise date 
* Any dilution to the share capital 
* How the valuation of options is made 
* Total costs for the board, including attendant costs 
* Separate disclosure of pension costs to former CEO and executive 
directors 
* All information found in one place in the annual report 
* Specification of the different programs 
* More company specific information 
* More tabular information 
 
 
4.3 Analysis of study one 
 
4.3.1 Demanded variables compared and contrasted 
Comparing table 4.1 Information demanded in media and 4.2 Information 
demanded by the interview respondents, several variables are found to overlap. 
Almost all of the variables discussed in media were also given by one or more 
interview respondents.   
Looking at the specific variables demanded, the different stakeholders do not 
request the same information. Credit analysts turned out not to use the remune-
ration information whatsoever, and the financial analysts at the different banks use 
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the information only to a limited extent. The information about remunerations is 
not of great importance for them when valuing companies. This could explain 
why most of the financial analysts express satisfaction with the information 
disclosed. Other groups are instead dissatisfied. For example, the consultants at 
Hallvarsson & Halvarsson, Nordic Investor Services and the large institutional 
owners are more concerned about the corporate governance, and consequently 
demand more detailed information.   
It is also interesting to compare the variables from the media review and the inter-
view respondents, with the existing regulations and recommendations. A first 
point to notice is that most of the variables cannot be found in the Annual 
Accounts Act, i.e. there is a demand for much more information than is regulated 
in Swedish legislation. The Code of Corporate Governance does neither cover all 
of the demanded variables, but only a few more. These include for example; 
information concerning the decision-making process, the reasons for why the 
company has variable remuneration and if there is any dilution of the share capital 
due to the remunerations.  
Some of the variables are found in the Swedish Industry and Commerce Stock 
Exchange Committee’s guidelines. These are mainly; how the valuation of the 
options is made, how many options that are offered, the exercise price and 
exercise date, any changes in the programs from last year, and historical infor-
mation from previous years. The number of people that take part of the programs, 
the time perspective and an evaluation of the programs, are mentioned in the 
recommendations from the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise.  
However, out of the examined rules, regulations and guidelines it is the EU 
Commission Recommendations that cover most of the variables mentioned in the 
media and the interviews. For example, a motivation of why the company needs 
to have variable remuneration, information concerning the decision-making 
process, any dilution to the share capital, information about the options that are 
offered, the exercise price and exercise date, individual remuneration for each 
executive director, and any changes in the program from previous year, can be 
found in the EU recommendations. It is even more interesting that it also covers 
the two variables that several of the interview respondents and the media debate 
requested in particular; specified performance criteria and the target achievement 
required.  
The variables given in the interviews or media that could not be found in any of 
the regulations or recommendations are; the number of employees that still have a 
defined-benefits based pension and what it may come to cost the company, the 
total cost for the board including attendant costs, separate disclosure of pension 
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costs to former CEO and executive directors, and that all information should be 
found in one place. 
 
4.3.2 Classification of the variables 
Compiling all the information demanded from the regulation and recommen-
dations and the demand expressed in media and from the interviews, results in a 
table of 41 variables. These have then been allocated into the four different levels 
in the classification system, where level four includes all variables in the previous 
levels. Level one only consists of variables binding by law, i.e. the Annual 
Accounts Act. These are as shown in table 4.3. The next level contains variables 
beyond the Annual Accounts Act but it is still very general in nature, as shown in 
table 4.4. The third level includes variables that give more firm-specific infor-
mation and therefore could be argued to give a higher transparency. These are 
found in table 4.5. The last level, full disclosure, includes all variables found on 
previous levels.  
An explanation of how the variables are interpreted can be found in appendix 1.  
 
Table 4.3 Classification level one; basic disclosure 
  Level 1: Basic disclosure 
1 The total cost of the program 
2 The total amount of salaries and other remuneration shall be specified for each of the 
following groups: 
  
1. The board directors, CEO and other executive directors 
  
2. Other employees not mentioned in 1 
3 Variable payments to board directors, CEO and other executive directors specified 
separately 
4 Salary and remuneration for the year specified separately for each board director 
(except employee representatives) and the CEO 
5 If the company has employees abroad, the sum of remunerations to board directors, 
CEO and other executive directors specified for each country 
6 The total amount of pension costs and commitments disclosed for board directors, 
CEO and other executive directors 
7 Number of persons specified for each group 
8 Information about pensions specified separately for each board director (except 
employee representatives) and the CEO 
9 If any golden parachutes/severance payments or alike  to board directors, CEO or 
others in the management  have been agreed, these should be disclosed with the most 
essential terms  
10 Remunerations as above, with pensions separately, disclosed for former board 
directors and former CEO 
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Table 4.4 Classification level two; general disclosure 
  Level 2: General disclosure 
11 The purpose of the incentive program  
12 Information concerning the preparatory and decision-making process 
13 Explanation of the relative importance of the variable and non-variable components 
14 Whether there is a ceiling on the variable remuneration 
15 Number of persons that take part of the programs 
16 The total remuneration and other benefits granted to individual executive directors 
over the relevant financial year 
17 Specify what program the CEO and other executive directors have 
18 Significant changes in the policy as compared to previous financial year 
19 Explanation of what year the performance was achieved 
20 Provide historical numbers for comparison 
21 Total estimated value of non-cash benefits considered as remuneration 
22 The number of share options offered or shares granted 
23 The number of share options exercised during the relevant financial year, the number 
of shares involved and the exercise price 
24 The number of share options unexercised at the end of the financial year; their 
exercise price and exercise date 
25 How the valuation of options is made 
26 Any dilution of the share capital that may result from the program 
27 How many employees that still have a defined-benefit based pension, and some 
indication of what it may come to cost the company 
28 Whether variable pay work as pensionable income 
29 The pensionable age for CEO and executive directors 
30 Whether pensions are revocable 
31 All information on remuneration found in one place 
Table 4.5 Classification level three; extended disclosure 
  Level 3: Extended disclosure 
32 Sufficient information on the performance criteria for variable remuneration 
33 Sufficient information on the link between remuneration and performance 
34 The target achievement required  
35 The main parameters and rationale for any annual bonus scheme and any other non-
cash benefits 
36 The reason for why remuneration is paid in the form of variable remuneration 
37 How the executive directors can influence the achievement of targets 
38 If targets are relative to other companies or indices, these companies and indices 
should be specified 
39 Total cost to the company in different conceivable outcomes 
40 Thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of the program 
41 The connection between paid out remuneration and the company’s development 
Table 4.6 Classification level four; full disclosure 
  Level 4: Full disclosure 
1-41 All variables demanded 
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5  Empirical findings and analysis of 
study two - the level of transparency  
 
In this chapter the empirical findings from the examination of annual reports will 
be presented and analyzed. The companies’ different levels of transparency will 
be analyzed using the theoretical framework. Complementary material can be 
found in the appendix. 
 
 
5.1 The fulfillment of variables demanded 
The study shows that the financial sector in general is marginally better than the 
industrial companies at providing transparent, company-specific information. Out 
of the total 41 examined variables the industrial and health care sectors fulfill 53 
percent each, whereas the financial sector reaches 58 percent (see table 5.1). 
However, one must be careful when interpreting these total numbers as it assumes 
that all the variables are equally weighted, something which obviously does not 
hold true. The details of the results can be found in appendix 2 
 
 Table 5.1 Fulfilled percentage per level 
 
Financials Health Care Industrials 
Basic disclosure 88% 83% 82% 
General disclosure 68% 62% 60% 
Extended disclosure 10% 0% 7% 
Full disclosure 0% 0% 0% 
Total 58% 53% 53% 
 
Looking instead at the conformity of different levels, the sectors are almost 
equally good at complying with the level of basic disclosure, even if the financial 
sector is a little bit ahead; 88, 83 and 82 percent respectively. The level of general 
disclosure however, is significantly harder to abide by. The industrial sector 
reaches an average of 60 percent, the health care industry 62 percent and the 
financials 68 percent. Thus, all companies are fulfilling the level of general 
disclosure, apart from NCC and Hufvudstaden which do not reach the threshold. 
There is a rather wide spread within this level, with Swedbank and Meda just 
qualifying and Nordea (86 percent), SEB (76 percent), Elekta and SKF (71 
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percent) being the high-performers. To advance further to the level of extended 
disclosure, another 50 percent of those variables should be fulfilled. Therefore, 
none of the companies manage to progress. Also at the level of extended disclo-
sure, the financial industry has the best disclosure with 10 percent compliance, 
compared to 7 percent in the industrial sector and 0 percent in the health care 
industry. It is noteworthy that Investor still manages to comply with 40 percent of 
level three, while the health care industry has zero percent disclosure. The health 
care industry is slightly better than the industrial industry at complying with the 
variables in levels one and two, whereas the industrial companies outperform the 
health care industry in level three.  
Volvo, SEB, Nordea and Investor have actually disclosed parts of the three first 
variables 32-34 relating to information about the performance criteria and the 
target levels, but only for their long-term incentive programs. However, they still 
overlook their short-term programs. They have therefore been regarded as not 
complying with the variables. Still, it is interesting to see the moderated result if 
their disclosure was accepted. Volvo would move from 11 to 44 percent 
compliance on the level, SEB from 0 to 30 percent, Nordea from 10 to 40 percent, 
and Investor from 40 to 70 percent. Had this been the standpoint, Investor would 
thus have qualified for the third level of transparency.  
Thus, the companies have the following transparency levels:  
 
 Table 5.2 Transparency levels of the companies 
Basic 
disclosure 
General 
disclosure 
Extended 
disclosure 
Full 
disclosure 
NCC Scania - - 
Hufvudstaden Volvo     
  SKF     
  Atlas Copco     
  Nordea     
  Swedbank     
  Investor     
  SEB     
  Elekta     
  Getinge     
  Meda     
 
Looking at particular variables in detail, almost all variables on a basic disclosure 
are fully complied with. This is to be expected given that it is enforced by the 
binding Annual Accounts Act. Variables five and ten are the only odd ones out 
with merely 33 and 8 percent compliance. At the level of general disclosure the 
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most outstanding variables are 31) that all information on remuneration should be 
found in one place, and 16) that total remuneration granted during the relevant 
financial year should be disclosed on an individual basis for all executive 
directors. Neither of these variables has been fulfilled by any of the companies.  
Other underachievers on this level are variables 19 and 27; what year the relevant 
performance was actually achieved (38 percent) as well as how many employees 
that still have a defined-benefit based pension and what it may come to cost the 
company (8 percent). According to one respondent, it is interesting to know about 
the number of employees with defined-benefit pensions in particular, to avoid any 
future surprises in case insufficient funds have been put aside. Regarding the 
timing of performance, it is often confusing and hard to understand to what year 
the performance and associated remuneration belong. Quite a few variables end 
up at 46 percent compliance; 11) the purpose of the incentive program, 15) the 
number of persons taking part of the programs, and 30) whether pensions are 
revocable.  
The variables fulfilled either by all companies or all but one, are 12) information 
on the preparatory process, 14) disclosure of the ceiling, 17) specification of what 
programs the CEO and other executive directors have, 22-24) the number of share 
options granted/exercised/unexercised, and 29) the pensionable age for the CEO 
and other executive directors.   
The majority of the companies do not fulfill any of the variables at the level of 
extended disclosure. The highest percentage score is for 38) disclosure of 
benchmarking companies or indices, but this is just because the variable is 
relevant only for three companies that make use of peer groups. It is still only one 
company that fulfills the variable. Most of the other variables are similarly only 
fulfilled by one or two of the companies. Investor is the only one to account for 
40) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the programs and 36) the reason for why 
variable remuneration is used, whereas Volvo is the only one that presents 41) the 
connection between paid out remuneration and the company’s development. 
Nordea and Investor give 35) the main parameters and rationale for any annual 
bonus scheme and any other non-cash benefits. Apart from 33-34) sufficient 
information on the link between remuneration and performance and the target 
achievement required, no company explain variable 37) how the executive 
directors can influence the achievement of targets, i.e. whether the criteria lies 
within their area of responsibility, nor 39) the total cost to the company in 
different conceivable outcomes.     
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5.2 Analysis of study two 
 
5.2.1 Accounting and stakeholder theory 
Accounting theory positions the annual report as the primary source of infor-
mation for stakeholders. However, as shown in the empirical findings, the given 
information is often restricted to that specified by statute. Thus, there seem to be a 
tension between what information stakeholders would like to have and what 
companies are prepared to provide, both in terms of quantity and quality of the 
information.  
The fact that the majority of the companies only comply with the minimum 
requirements from the Annual Accounts Act at the first level and a few variables 
at the second level could be analyzed from the perspective of the different 
qualitative characteristics of financial information. Transparency is much 
contingent on the manner in which executive directors’ remuneration is communi-
cated, and the presentation may cause as much trouble to investors as the actual 
quantity of information. 
As found in the first study, not all stakeholders demand the same information, and 
there is further a difference in how much information they demand. As Elliott and 
Elliott (2006) argue, it is virtually impossible to satisfy everyone’s demand for 
information and all information can hardly be relevant to everyone. The state-
ments are used by a variety of different stakeholders which may force the compa-
nies to prioritize between the different interests and demand for information. This 
in turn implies that the management has much freedom of manoeuvre to decide 
what information demand to satisfy, according to Clarke (2007). Instead of 
disclosing all the information that every stakeholder group requires, they may 
choose a middle path where they satisfy enough stakeholders or their most 
important stakeholders. The consequence is that for some stakeholders the 
relevance criterion in accounting theory is fulfilled which explains why some of 
them think it is fully transparent, whereas the transparency is far from satisfying 
for others. 
Even though there seem to be some differences in what information the stake-
holders require, it is nonetheless in everyone’s interest that the information is 
correctly reproduced, complete, prudent, and that it faithfully represents the 
substance of transactions, i.e. that it is reliable information. As the study shows, 
the information is nevertheless at least not complete to all stakeholders. Whether 
it is correctly reproduced and prudent cannot be confirmed by this study, but it is 
however worth mentioning that one of the interviewees, Halldén, said that he 
often encounters factual errors and careless mistakes when looking at the remune-
ration information in the annual reports.  
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For the sake of comparability, several variables are important to facilitate 
comparison of the remunerations both over time and between companies. 
However, the two variables 20) “provide historical numbers for comparison” and 
18) “significant changes in the policy as compared to previous financial year” are 
of special importance for the comparability. Both these are fulfilled by the 
majority of the companies, but three and four companies respectively do not give 
this information. It can also be pointed out that historical numbers for only one 
year was demanded and few of the companies exceeded this, although it would be 
even better with several years in comparison. 
The ASB Principles only require information to be understandable to users that 
have a reasonable knowledge of business, economic activities and accounting, as 
well as willingness to study it with reasonable diligence. However, the aim has 
got to be to improve the clarity so also the average investor has a chance at 
comprehending. The Commission of Trust did state that to deal with the declining 
confidence, clear, intelligible, correct and relevant information should be 
provided, but more importantly, the information should not be so complex that 
only an expect could understand and evaluate it. Even though there is no single 
variable in the empirical findings that check for the understandability of the 
information in particular, the authors can confirm that a lot of the information was 
hard to understand and evaluate even with a reasonable knowledge of business 
and accounting.  
In addition, much of the information about executive remuneration is found in two 
places, both in the notes and in the corporate governance report, which may 
render a proper evaluation more difficult. At the first level in the classification 
system, the most outstanding variable is indeed that all information on remune-
ration should be found in one place, and the observed result is zero percent com-
pliance. This is however to expect since some information is regulated to be dis-
closed in the notes to the annual report while other information is supposed to be 
given in the corporate governance report. This does impair the understandability 
and thereby the transparency of the remunerations.  
The inherent conflict between the qualitative characteristics, causing a trade-off 
between the relevance and the understandability of the remuneration information, 
is potentially confirmed by the mediocre level of conformance and transparency. 
The remuneration information is already fairly complex and the decision to 
disclose more relevant information has to take into consideration the risk of 
impairing the understandability. According to the UK ASB however, the 
companies should disclose all relevant information even if it may cause problems 
of comprehension for some users. What is more, as Halldén expresses above, the 
completeness and correctness of the remuneration information, i.e. the reliability, 
60 
 
5.2.2 Agency and managerialist theory 
In the light of the agency theory and its assumption of self-interested, rational 
individuals, executives may avoid excessive transparency and prioritize form over 
substance of the information by concealing some information. Thereby, they 
would fulfill the minimum level but avoid the need for any further explanation. 
Since this study does not investigate the reason for the different levels of transpa-
rency it has not been possible to confirm this theory, but the results indicate that a 
majority does choose to fulfill only a little more than the minimum level. As 
argued by Clarke (2007), for legitimate companies and truthful managers it would 
be of interest to mitigate the agency problem and any adverse selection premium 
by facilitating efficient markets in corporate control and information. As could be 
seen, a few companies do indeed give out some further information.  
To ensure shareholders’ funds and to counteract any managerial hegemony, the 
board should act as a control mechanism and promote an active role of the 
owners. It is still debated whether the board or the owners should be responsible 
for the setting of directors’ remuneration but regardless, investors need adequate 
information to base their evaluation on and to vote on the principals of the 
schemes. The first study also showed that the stakeholders are interested in infor-
mation concerning the preparatory and decision-making process, and the second 
study shows that all the companies have provided information on this point. 
However, as can be seen in appendix 1, the requirement was merely for a general 
account of the process. It could therefore be questioned whether the owners really 
get enough information about the decision-making process to counteract any 
managerial hegemony.  
 
5.2.3 Transparency and confidence 
The level of transparency could be deliberately chosen by the companies as a 
result of a thorough cost-benefit analysis where a reduced cost of capital is eva-
luated against the risk of competitive disadvantage, some kind of “optimal trans-
parency”. The study shows that some of the companies such as Investor and 
Nordea disclose much more information than their peers, and in so doing almost 
reach the third level in the classification system. They may have chosen to 
disclose more to reduce the risk of “outrage costs” mentioned by Bebchuk and 
Fried. Companies that realize the benefits with transparent information often 
make voluntary disclosure beyond the minimum requirements in response to 
market demand.    
On the contrary, Hufvudstaden and NCC choose a much lower level of transpa-
rency. Because of the potential loss of key competence or the cost of compiling 
the information, the companies may prefer a lower level of transparency. The 
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results also show that that there is a tendency not to disclose excessive infor-
mation at the level of extended disclosure in the classification system, especially 
information that could be of sensitive and proprietary nature which may cause a 
competitive disadvantage to the company. This is further confirmed by the inter-
view respondents. The performance criteria and targets seem to be the most 
critical variable in this respect, as companies do not want to reveal what goals 
they strive towards and their strategic direction. None of the companies examined 
presents enough information on the link between remuneration and performance 
or the required target achievement, presumably because of the sensitiveness of the 
information.  
Another example of arguably sensitive information is the individual disclosure of 
each executive’s remuneration. None of the companies disclose this information, 
which could be to protect the integrity of the individuals or to avoid the “ratchet 
effect” mentioned in the EUCGF statement 2009. According to both the EU 
Commission Recommendation and the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 
companies are not expected to disclose information of sensitive nature, but Dalton 
and Dalton (2008) argue that the competitive environment might also be used by 
the companies as a justification for perquisites and poor disclosure of them. 
Thus, the observed level of disclosure and transparency may be a deliberate 
balance between the advantages of reduced information asymmetries and a lower 
cost of capital, and the disadvantages in terms of competitiveness and excessive 
administration costs - that is “optimal transparency” according to Oxelheim 
(2006). Companies may trade-off the cost of capital to avoid the exposure of too 
much sensitive information.         
 
5.2.4 Regulation and recommendations 
In terms of variables, almost the entire level of basic disclosure is fulfilled by all 
companies which can be expected since the variables come from the binding 
Annual Accounts Act. There are two outliers however; the variable about disclo-
sure for executive directors in all subsidiaries around the world (33 percent), and 
the requirement to disclose remuneration and pensions for former board directors 
and CEO (8 percent). Given the difficulties to interpret paragraphs §20 and 23-24 
in the Annual Accounts Act argued by Janzon, Törning & Arnell (2008), the 
result is not very surprising and a clarification of the definitions is vital. With the 
current formulation, remuneration information for potentially hundreds of people 
in all subsidiaries would be necessary. Further, if former is interpreted as anyone 
who has ever had a particular position, similarly hundreds of people would have 
to be accounted for. Thus, the low level of compliance on these variables may 
either be because of misinterpretation or because companies consider the admin-
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istrative burden to be too high. Moreover, the multitude of overlapping regulatory 
frameworks in Sweden can be expected to create confusion for both companies 
and investors, possibly causing the mediocre transparency.  
The request for all information on remuneration to be in one place, and the 
requirement to disclose the total remuneration on an individual basis for all 
executive directors have scored zero on compliance. This is probably because 
neither of the variables is required by any of the Swedish binding regulations. 
Both points are however legitimately demanded, the first by interview respon-
dents and the second by the EU Commission. Sweden is particularly bad at 
presenting the information assembled in one place in the annual report, which 
does impair the transparency. Regarding the latter variable, individual disclosure 
is currently only required for the CEO and board directors, but The Commission 
of Trust already in 2004 lobbied for an extension of the Annual Accounts Act and 
the Companies Act to include a requirement for individual disclosure of the terms 
of employment for all the executive directors and all board members in a listed 
company, following NBK’s guidelines (SOU 2004:47, p.227).  
As stated in the theoretical framework, and somewhat verified by the more 
specific information demanded by stakeholders in the first study, the existing rules 
and recommendations are in general rather unclear, ambiguous and unspecific. 
They leave much room for “creative compliance”, and minimum requirements can 
be achieved without really revealing much useful information at all. As can be 
seen in this study the companies do avoid the more company specific explana-
tions. For example, none of the companies disclose the specific performance 
criteria or target levels. An explanation such as the one given by Atlas Copco; 
“variable compensation is dependent upon how certain quantitative and qualita-
tive goals set in advance are achieved” is a typical example of general rather than 
specific information disclosure. This highly affects the level of transparency.       
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6  Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This final chapter will present the conclusion and answer the research question. A 
further discussion will be held and the chapter will conclude with suggestions for 
future research. 
 
 
This study has examined several different sources in order to compile the demand 
for information on directors’ remuneration, and thereby ascertain what infor-
mation is needed for annual reports to qualify as adequately transparent. 
Moreover, the remuneration information provided in the annual reports of 
different companies has been examined. Thus, the study has analyzed the level of 
transparency in Swedish listed companies.   
The first study shows that demand in general exceeds the information that is 
required by statute. Stakeholders require much more firm-specific information 
with motivations as well as evaluations of the remuneration programs. In 
particular, a clearer connection between payments and performance have been 
requested, both individual achievements and the company’s overall development. 
However, there seems to be a difference in what information the different stake-
holders require, where the financial analysts demand less detailed information 
than owner representatives at the pension and institutional funds.  
The total demand for information was compiled into a list of 41 variables and 
subsequently divided into the four levels of transparency, where the variables that 
require more firm-specific information imply a higher level of transparency.   
Analyzing the annual reports of Swedish large listed companies, an overall 
mediocre level of transparency was found. The majority of the companies comply 
only with a few variables at the second level, apart from the minimum 
requirements. Two companies merely qualify for the first level of transparency, 
basic disclosure, while all other companies at least fulfill the variables at level 
two, general disclosure. No company reaches the third level, extended disclosure, 
although one company comes very close. This shows that the companies are 
especially poor at disclosing the more firm-specific information that was 
requested by several of the stakeholders. In particular, the specific performance 
criteria and targets are desired by the majority, but none of the companies disclose 
sufficient information in this regard.   
In conclusion, the market for information on directors’ remuneration is in 
disequilibrium, caused by a supply deficit. Therefore, the transparency of the 
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disclosed directors’ remuneration has been found to be mediocre, since no 
company fulfills a higher level than general disclosure.  
Of the investigated sectors, the financial industry appears to be somewhat more 
transparent than the industrial or health care sector. The higher transparency in the 
financial companies can possibly be explained by the fact that they earn their 
living through confidence and have to build trust with their customers and inves-
tors. Moreover, a possible explanation can be that the financial companies have 
been particularly under scrutiny in the recent debate about bonuses, and special 
guidelines exist for companies in this sector.  
The overall mediocre transparency can have several underlying causes and even if 
this thesis does not primarily intend to explain the level of transparency but 
merely establish it, a few possible explanations exist. The current regulations 
appear rather limited and prone to misinterpretations, which may constitute one 
reason for the low level of disclosure. In terms of the qualitative characteristics of 
information, the result may also be caused by a trade-off between relevance, 
reliability and understandability. The different demand for information of 
different stakeholders makes it impossible to provide everyone with relevant 
information. This explains why some are satisfied with the current disclosure, 
while others desire much more company-specific information. Apparently, the 
information is neither entirely reliable. Although the variables concerning 
comparability were fulfilled my most companies, it would be even better if more 
historical information was disclosed. The study has not been able to conclude 
anything regarding understandability, apart from the authors’ opinion that the 
information is complex and exceptionally hard to understand. Moreover, had the 
remuneration information been assembled in one place in the annual report a 
proper evaluation would have been facilitated, as supported by the interviews. 
A pure speculation is that executives may avoid excessive transparency to serve 
their own purposes, such as unjustified perquisites and bonuses. Ambiguous and 
slack regulations, as well as diversified stakeholders, arguably leave management 
with a lot of freedom of manoeuvre when it comes to disclosures. Finally, the 
level of transparency may be a deliberate choice, having weighted the advantages 
of reduced cost of capital against the disadvantages of revealing sensitive infor-
mation. Several of the respondents and the regulatory bodies are sympathetic 
when it comes to disclosing potentially sensitive information, and there are 
exemptions for information of this nature. However, it is debatable whether the 
owners get sufficient information to evaluate the programs and counteract any 
managerial hegemony.  
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6.1 Suggestions for future research 
An extension of this study is possible in several ways. It would be interesting to 
elaborate on the differences in transparency between different sectors, and 
therefore investigate several other industries as well. Moreover, this study only 
looked at “large cap” companies, but a further study of companies of different 
sizes could reveal differences in transparency. One could go one step further and 
investigate the reasons behind the transparency levels, either by interviewing the 
companies and in a qualitative study derive the explanation, or by running a 
regression with different explanatory factors such as e.g. size, ownership structure 
and degree of foreign ownership. It would be of interest to investigate the impact 
of transparency on the actual levels of remuneration, as well as reviewing all 
manners of communication including the information on websites and the notice 
to annual general meetings. Lastly, instead of the classification system a transpa-
rency index could be constructed. This would however require consideration of 
the different weights, to get a reasonable result.  
 
  
66 
 
  
67 
 
Reference list 
 
Books 
Alvesson, M & Svenningsson, S (2007) Organisationer, ledning och processer, 
Studentlitteratur, Polen.  
Artsberg, K (2005) Redovisningsteori - policy och praxis, Liber Ekonomi, Malmö. 
Bryman, A & Bell, E (2005) Företagsekonomiska forskningsmetoder, Liber, Malmö. 
Clarke, T (2007) International Corporate Governance - A Comparative approach, 
Routledge, Oxon.  
Elliott, B & Elliott, J (2006) Financial Accounting and Reporting, 10th edn, Pearson 
Education Limited, Essex.   
Jacobsen, D.I (2002) Vad, hur och varför?, Studentlitteratur, Lund. 
Oxelheim, L (ed) (2006) Corporate and Institutional Transparency for Economic Growth 
in Europe, Elsevier, Oxford. 
Oxelheim, L & Wihlborg, C (ed.) (2008) Markets and Compensation for Executives in 
Europe, Emerald, Bingley.  
 
Academic journals 
Albert-Roulhac, C & Breen, P (2005) ‘Corporate governance in Europe: current status 
and future trends’, Journal of Business Strategy, vol.26, no.6, pp.19-29. Retrieved 
April 6, 2009, from 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/ViewContentServlet?Filename=Published/
EmeraldFullTextArticle/Articles/2880260605.html 
Beller, A.L (2004) ‘Executive Compensation Disclosure’, Insights; the Corporate & 
Securities Law Advisor, vol.18, no.12, pp.20-25. Retrieved April 1, 2009, from 
ABI/INFORM Global database. 
Carlsson, R.H (2007) ‘Swedish Corporate Governance and Value Creation: owners still 
in the driver’s seat?’, The Author, vol.15, no.6, pp.1038-1055. Retrieved April 23, 
2009, from elin@lund database. 
Dalton, R.D & Dalton C.M (2008) ‘Corporate governance in the post Sarbanes-Oxley 
period: Compensation disclosure and analysis (CD&A)’, Business Horizons, 
vol.51, pp.85-92. Retrieved April 6, 2009, from elin@lund database.  
Donahue, S.M (2008) ‘Executive compensation: the new executive compensation 
disclosure’, Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, vol.13, no.1, pp.59-
87. Retrieved April 6, 2009, from ABI/INFORM Global database.  
Fama, E.F & Jensen, M.C (1983) ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law 
and Economics, vol.26, no.2, pp.301-325. Retrieved April 23, 2009, from 
http://www.jstor.org/pss/725104  
Ferrarini, G & Ungureanu, M.C (2009) ‘Fixing Directors' Remuneration in Europe - 
Governance, Regulation and Disclosure’, Roundtable on Directors’ Remuneration 
European Commission 23 March 2009, pp.1-22. Retrieved April 27, 2009, from 
68 
 
http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/documents/ferrarini_ungureanu_presentation_m
ar2009.pdf  
Grant, G (2008), ‘Complying with the SEC’s Compensation Discussion and Analysis 
Requirements’, The CPA Journal, vol.78, no.9, pp.30-32. Retrieved April 6, 2009, 
from ABI/INFORM Global database. 
Janzon, C, Törning, E & Arnell, G (2008) ’Målet missas i lagens nya krav! ÅRL:s 
upplysningskrav om ersättningar till ledande befattningshavare’, Balans, no. 2. 
Retrieved May 17, 2009, from FAR KOMPLETT online.   
Mallette P, Middlemist, R.D & Hopkins, W.E (1995) ‘Social, Political and Economic 
Determinants of Chief Executive Compensation’, Journal of Managerial Issues, 
vol.7. Retrieved April 27, 2009, from 
http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=KZhcQ72QQh3lh0lKSLzPv
Y5p1pGjPHsrV15KNYSTKnLqvCKLRpvf!-
1597424203!73151239?docId=5000350623 
Mesa Graziano, C (2006) ‘Will Revealing More Be Enough’, Financial Executive, 
vol.22, no.12, pp.32-34. Retrieved April 1, 2009, from ABI/INFORM Global 
database. 
Miller, S (2008) ‘Many Don’t Disclose Executive Pay Goals’, HRMagazine, vol.53, no.3, 
pp.33. Retrieved April 6, 2009, from elin@lund database.   
Oxelheim, L (2003) ‘Macroeconomic Variables and Corporate Performance’, Financial 
Analysts Journal, vol.59, no.4, pp. 36–50. 
Unger, S (2006) ‘Special features of Swedish corporate governance’, The Swedish 
Corporate Governance Board. Retrieved January 7, 2009, from 
http://www.scania.com/Images/Special_features_of_Swedish_Corporate_Governan
ce_tcm10-151579.pdf 
 
Media articles 
’Aktiespararna tar ton mot bonusar’ (2009) Borås Tidning, March 18. Retrieved April 20, 
2009, from http://www.bt.se/nyheter/ekonomi/tt_ekonomi/aktiespararna-tar-ton-
mot-bonusar(1217003).gm 
’AMF:s ordförande: Årsredovisningarna har varit tydliga’ (2009) Dagens Industri, March 
25. Retrieved April 29, 2009, from 
http://di.se/Nyheter/?page=/Avdelningar/Artikel.aspx%3FArticleID%3D2009%25
5C03%255C25%255C330476   
Blomberg, M (2008) ’Medierubriker driver VD-ersättningarna’, Aktiespararna.se, 
September 11. Retrieved May 3, 2009, from 
http://www.aktiespararna.se/artiklar/Reportage/Medierubriker-driver-VD-
ersattningarna/ 
Lundberg-Markow, C (2009) ’Kräv att bonusprogram redovisas öppet’, Folksam 
homepage. Retrieved May 2, 2009, from 
http://www.folksam.se/polopoly_fs/1.55797!/folksam%20debatt%20%20kr%C3%
A4v%20att%20bonusprogram%20redovisas%20%C3%B6ppet.pdf  
Nachemson-Ekwall, S (2009) ’Dags att visa hur stor chefens bonus kan bli’, di.se, April 
21. Retrieved from April 17, 2009, from 
69 
 
http://di.se/Avdelningar/ArtikelUtskrift.aspx?ArticleId=2009%5C04%5C17%5C33
3330&type=art  
Olsson, T (2009a) ‘Het debatt om ersättningar’, Aktiespararna.se, January 29. Retrieved 
May 19, 2009, from http://www.aktiespararna.se/artiklar/Reportage/Het-debatt-om-
ersattningar/  
Olsson, T (2009b) ’Bonusarna måste ändras’, Aktiespararna.se, February 11. Retrieved 
April 16, 2009, from 
http://www.aktiespararna.se/artiklar/Opinion/Bonuskritiken-skarps/  
Palutko Macéus, K (2009) ’Hon vill se tydligare policy för bonusar’, Dagens Industri, 
April 28.   
’SEB-direktörerna avstår löneökning’ (2009) Veckans Affärer, March 13. Retrieved April 
29, 2009, from http://www.va.se/nyheter/2009/03/13/seb-direktorerna-avstar-
loneokn/  
Sidea, E (2009), ’Bonusarna måste ändras’, Veckans Affärer, February 11. Retrieved May 
3, 2009, from http://www.va.se/nyheter/2009/02/11/forsta-ap-fonden/ 
Svensson, K (2007) ’AP-fonder vill syna SEB’, di.se, February 9. Retrieved May 19, 
2009, from     
http://di.se/Avdelningar/ArtikelUtskrift.aspx?ArticleId=2008%5C02%5C09%5C26
9527&type=art 
Svidén, H (2009) ’Bonusdebatten får inte leda till detaljreglering’, April 17. Retrieved 
April 17, 2009, from 
http://www.svensktnaringsliv.se/fragor/fakta_om_loner_och_arbetstid/article75784
.ece   
 
Other 
ABS (1999) Accounting Standards Board, Statement of principals for financial reporting. 
Retrieved May 20, 2009, from http://www.frc.org.uk/asb/technical/principles.cfm 
SFS 2005:551 Aktiebolagslagen  
AMN 2002:1 (Aktiemarknadsnämnden) Statement of the Securities Council 2002:01. 
Retrieved April 9, 2009, from 
http://www.aktiemarknadsnamnden.se/UserFiles/uttalanden/2002/e1/eng200201.ht
m 
EUCGF Conference 23 March (2009) Statement of the European Corporate Governance 
Forum on Director Remuneration’. Retrieved April 6, 2009, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-
remuneration_en.pdf 
EC/913/2004 European Commission Recommendation (2004) Fostering an appropriate 
regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies. Retrieved April 6, 
2009, from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:385:0055:0059:EN:PDF  
ECGI (2003) European corporate governance institute, Directors’ Remuneration in Listed 
Companies Sweden. Retrieved April 7, 2009, from 
http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/sweden.pdf  
70 
 
ECGI (2008) European corporate governance institute, Directors’ Remuneration in Listed 
Companies Sweden. Retrieved April 7, 2009, from 
http://www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/sweden_update_2008.pdf 
FAR SRS (2008) Löner och ersättningar i publika aktiebolag. Retrieved April 25, 2009, 
from 
http://www.farsrs.se/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/FAR/NYHETSARKIV/NYHETSARKI
V%202008/FRAMST%C4LLAN%2520L%D6NER%2520OCH%2520ERS%C4T
TNINGAR.PDF 
Första AP-fonden, Krav på incitamentsprogram. Retrieved April 17, 2009, from 
http://www.ap1.se/sv/Forvaltningen/Bolagsstyrning/Krav-pa-incitamentsprogram/ 
Hallvarsson & Halvarsson (2008a) Incitamentsprogram i börsnoterade företag; Hur 
beskrivs omfattning och utformning av incitamentsprogram i kallelsen till 
årssstämman? Mediedebatten Retrieved May 3, 2009, from 
http://www.halvarsson.se/Global/Incitamentsprogram-i-b%C3%B6rsnoterade-
bolag.pdf 
Hallvarsson & Halvarsson (2008b) Mediedebatten om ersättningar – en förtroendefråga 
för ägare, styrelse och VD. Retrieved May 3, 2009, from 
http://www.halvarsson.se/Global/Debatten%20om%20ers%C3%A4ttningar%20C.
pdf   
Mercer Perspective (2007) Executive compensation disclosure in Europe. Retrieved April 
27, 2009, from http://www.mercer.com/referencecontent.htm?idContent=1282000 
Näringslivets Börskommitté (2002) Regler angående information om ledande 
befattningshavares förmåner. Retrieved April 3, 2009, from 
http://www.naringslivetsborskommitte.se/UserFiles/Dokument/Befattningshavare_
2002_v2.pdf  
Organization for economic co-operation and development (OECD) (2004) Principles of 
Corporate Governance. Retrieved April 29, 2009, from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf 
SOU 2009:34 Statens Offentliga Utredningar, Förenklingar i aktiebolagslagen m.m. 
Slutbetänkande av Utredningen om ett enklare aktiebolag. Retrieved May 14, 
2009, from http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/11385/a/124442  
SOU 2004:47 Statens Offentliga Utredningar, Förtroendekommissionens rapport: 
Förtroendet för näringslivet – dialog, analys, förslag. Retrieved April 26, 2009, 
from http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108/a/20445  
Svenskt Näringsliv (2006) Vägledning avseende ersättningar till VD och ledande 
befattningshavare. Retrieved April 17, 2009, from 
http://www.svensktnaringsliv.se/multimedia/archive/00002/V_gledning_avseende_
e_2148a.pdf 
Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (2008) issued by The Swedish Corporate 
Governance Board. Retrieved April 25, 2009, from 
http://www.corporategovernanceboard.se/media/35382/swecode_08_090421.pdf 
ÅRL 1995:1554, Årsredovisningslagen, FAR SRS Förlag, Stockholm. 
 
71 
 
Websites 
Nordic Investor Services: www.nordicinvestorservices.com  
Hallvarsson & Halvarsson: www.hallvarsson.se 
Första AP-fonden: http://www.ap1.se/ 
 
Annual reports  
Atlas Copco (2008) Nordea (2008) 
Elekta (2007/2008) SEB (2008) 
Getinge (2008) SKF (2008) 
Hufvudstaden (2008) Swedbank (2008) 
Investor (2008) Volvo (2008) 
Meda (2008) Scania (2008) 
NCC (2008)  
 
Interviews 
Respondent A, telephone interview 2008-04-22 
Burén Carl-Gustaf, Svenskt Närningsliv, telephone interview 2008-04-25 
Dalhammar Magnus, Handelsbanken, telephone interview 2008-05-13 
Ekdahl Ossian, Första AP-Fonden, telephone interview 2008-04-23 
Halldén David, HQ Bank, e-mail communication 2008-05-05 
Hansson Anders, Danske Bank, e-mail communication 2008-05-08 
Rännar Albin, Nordic Investor Services, telephone interview 2008-05-07 
Thulin Gabriel, Hallvarsson & Halvarsson, telephone interview 2008-05-04 
Ullman Tomas, Erik Penser Bankaktiebolag, telephone interview 2005-05-08 
  
72 
 
  
73 
 
Appendix 1 
  Variables  Description 
1 The total cost of the program   
2 The total amount of salaries and other 
remuneration shall be specified for each of the 
following groups: 
  
  
1. The board directors, CEO and executive 
directors 
  
  
2. Other employees not mentioned in 1   
3 Variable payments to board directors, CEO and 
executives specified separately 
  
4 Salary and remuneration for the year specified 
separately for each board director (except 
employee representatives) and the CEO 
  
5 If the company has employees abroad, the sum 
of remunerations to board directors, CEO and 
executive directors specified for each country 
The information should be provided for all 
executive directors in subsidiaries 
worldwide. Aggregated disclosure is 
allowed but the variable remuneration 
shall be separated for each country.  
6 The total amount of pension costs and 
commitments disclosed for board directors, 
CEO and executive directors 
Aggregate. 
7 Number of persons specified for each group For groups 1 & 2 as in Annual Accounts 
Act 
8 Information about pensions  specified 
separately for each board director (except 
employee representatives) and the CEO 
  
9 If any golden parachutes/severance payments or 
alike  to board directors, CEO or others in the 
management  have been agreed, these should be 
disclosed with the most essential terms  
Since it is impossible to know if all 
essential terms are disclosed a very 
general explanation is required, but at least 
the maximum severance pay must be 
disclosed.  
10 Remunerations as above, with pensions 
separately, disclosed for former board directors 
and former CEO 
Also former CEOs and board directors 
have to be accounted for. 
11 The purpose of the incentive program  A very general explanation is sufficient.  
An example from SKF is; "The purpose of 
the program is to motivate and 
compensate value-creating achievements 
in order to support operational and 
financial targets." 
12 Information concerning the preparatory and 
decision-making process 
Specify what people that take part in the 
preparation and decision-making process, 
and if there is a remuneration committee.  
13 Explanation of the relative importance of the 
variable and non-variable components 
An explanation of the variable 
remuneration as a percentage of the total 
remuneration or of fixed remuneration is 
enough.  
14 Whether there is a ceiling on the variable 
remuneration 
Disclose also if there is no ceiling. 
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15 Number of persons that take part of the 
programs 
The total number of participants in the 
different programs shall be disclosed.  
16 The total remuneration and other benefits 
granted to individual executives over the 
relevant financial year 
The information should be provided on an 
individual basis for all executive directors, 
not only board directors and the CEO. 
17 Specify what program the CEO and executive 
directors have 
  
18 Significant changes in the policy as compared 
to previous financial year 
Approval is given if the changes are 
explained or if it is stated that no changes 
are made.  
19 Explanation of what year the performance was 
achieved 
  
20 Provide historical numbers for comparison Comparable numbers for at least the year 
before have to be given, not only for the 
total cost but for the groups (1&2) as well. 
21 Total estimated value of non-cash benefits 
considered as remuneration 
Monetary value. 
22 The number of share options offered or shares 
granted 
  
23 The number of share options exercised during 
the relevant financial year, the number of shares 
involved and the exercise price 
  
24 The number of share options unexercised at the 
end of the financial year; their exercise price 
and exercise date 
  
25 How the valuation of options is made It is not enough to say that it is calculated 
with the Black & Sholes valuation model, 
but the main parameters used for the 
valuation has to be disclosed as well.  
26 Any dilution of the share capital that may result 
from the program 
  
27 How many employees that still have a defined-
benefit based pension, and some indication of 
what it may come to cost the company 
  
28 Whether variable pay work as pensionable 
income 
  
29 The pensionable age for CEO and executives   
30 Whether pensions are revocable Whether pensions are contingent on future 
employment or not. 
31 All information on remuneration found in one 
place 
  
32 Sufficient information on the performance 
criteria for variable remuneration 
The specific criteria shall be disclosed, 
e.g. if the measures are EPS, ROI, TVA or 
others. It is not enough to only state that 
the performance criteria are different key 
performance indicators. 
33 Sufficient information on the link between 
remuneration and performance 
State how much that will be paid out in 
remuneration if the targets are reached. If 
only the maximum remuneration is 
disclosed, it has to be explained if the 
remuneration is allotted proportionately or 
with another method of distribution.  
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34 The target achievement required Disclose the exact target levels required 
for remuneration to be allotted.  
35 The main parameters and rationale for any 
annual bonus scheme and any other non-cash 
benefits 
An explanation of why the company uses 
bonuses i.e. variable remuneration that is 
not related to individual performance and 
non-cash benefits, and how they are 
distributed.  
36 The reason for why remuneration is paid in the 
form of variable remuneration 
A very firm-specific explanation of why 
the company needs variable remuneration 
and how it benefits the owners.  
37 How the executives can influence the 
achievement of targets 
If the achievement of the targets are really 
within the executive's area of 
responsibility or what other factors that 
may influence the achievement.  
38 If targets are relative to other companies or 
indices, these companies and indices should be 
specified 
  
39 Total cost to the company in different 
conceivable outcomes 
Presentation of different scenarios. 
40 Thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
program 
An evaluation should be made and the 
main results should be disclosed in the 
annual report.  
41 The connection between paid out remuneration 
and the company’s development 
For example the remunerations' 
connection to the financial result the year 
the performance was achieved or how it 
relates to the company’s business cycle.  
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Level 1: Basic disclosure 
The total cost of the program 
The total amount of salaries and other remuneration shall be specified for each of the 
following groups: 
1. The board directors, CEO and other executive directors 
2. Other employees not mentioned in 1 
Variable payments to board directors, CEO and other executive directors specified 
separately 
Salary and remuneration for the year specified separately for each board director 
(except employee representatives) and the CEO 
If the company has employees abroad, the sum of remunerations to board directors, 
CEO and other executive directors specified for each country 
The total amount of pension costs and commitments disclosed for board directors, 
CEO and other  executive directors 
Number of persons specified for each group 
Information about pensions  specified separately for each board director (except 
employee representatives) and the CEO 
If any golden parachutes/severance payments or alike  to board directors, CEO or 
others in the management  have been agreed, these should be disclosed with the 
most essential terms  
Remunerations as above, with pensions separately, disclosed for former board 
directors and former CEO 
  
Fulfilled variables 
Fulfilled percentage 
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1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
  
13 
62% 
MEDA 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
  
11 
52% 
HUFV 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
  
7 
47% 
SEB 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
  
16 
76% 
NOR 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
  
18 
86% 
INV 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
  
14 
67% 
SWE 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
* 
0 
0 
1 
1 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
  
8 
53% 
Level  2: General disclosure 
The purpose of the incentive program  
Information concerning the preparatory and decision-making process 
Explanation of the relative importance of the variable and non-variable components 
Whether there is a ceiling on the variable remuneration 
Number of persons that take part of the programs 
The total remuneration and other benefits granted to individual executive directors 
over the relevant financial year 
Specify what program the CEO and other executive directors have 
Significant changes in the policy as compared to previous financial year 
Explanation of what year the performance was achieved 
Provide historical numbers for comparison 
Total estimated value of non-cash benefits considered as remuneration 
The number of share options offered or shares granted 
The number of share options exercised during the relevant financial year, the number 
of shares involved and the exercise price 
The number of share options unexercised at the end of the financial year; their 
exercise price and exercise date 
How the valuation of options is made 
Any dilution of the share capital that may result from the program 
How many employees that still have a defined-benefit based pension, and some 
indication of what it may come to cost the company 
Whether variable pay work as pensionable income 
The pensionable age for CEO and other executive directors 
Whether pensions are revocable 
All information on remuneration found in one place 
  
Fulfilled variables
Fulfilled percentage
  
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
  
  
  
78 
 
  
15% 
0% 
0% 
15% 
8% 
0% 
33% 
0% 
8% 
8% 
  
  
  
 
VOL 
0/1 
0/1 
0/1 
0 
0 
0 
* 
0 
0 
1 
  
1 
11% 
 
SKF 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* 
0 
0 
0 
  
1 
11% 
 
SCA 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* 
0 
0 
0 
  
1 
11% 
 
AC 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* 
0 
0 
0 
  
0 
0% 
 
NCC 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* 
0 
0 
0 
  
0 
0% 
 
ELE 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* 
0 
0 
0 
  
0 
0% 
 
GET 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* 
0 
0 
0 
  
0 
0% 
 
MEDA 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* 
0 
0 
0 
  
0 
0% 
 
HUFV 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* 
0 
0 
0 
  
0 
0% 
 
SEB 
0/1 
0/1 
0/1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
  
0 
0% 
 
NOR 
0/1 
0/1 
0/1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
  
1 
10% 
 
INV 
0/1 
0/1 
0/1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
  
4 
40% 
 
SWE 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
* 
0 
0 
0 
  
0 
0% 
 
Level  3: Extended disclosure 
Sufficient information on the performance criteria for variable remuneration* 
Sufficient information on the link between remuneration and performance* 
The target achievement required* 
The main parameters and rationale for any annual bonus scheme and any other non-
cash benefits 
The reason for why remuneration is paid in the form of variable remuneration 
How the executives can influence the achievement of targets 
If targets are relative to other companies or indices, these companies and indices 
should be specified 
Total cost to the company in different conceivable outcomes 
Thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of the program 
The connection between paid out remuneration and the company’s development 
 Fulfilled variables 
Fulfilled percentage 
* 0/1 means that they fulfill the variable for their long-term incentive programs but not for the short-term 
incentive programs 
 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
  
VOL 
  
24 
60% 
SKF 
  
24 
60% 
SCA 
  
19 
53% 
AC 
  
21 
54% 
NCC 
  
13 
37% 
ELE 
  
23 
58% 
GET 
  
22 
55% 
MEDA 
  
19 
48% 
HUFV 
  
15 
45% 
SEB 
  
24 
59% 
NOR 
  
28 
68% 
INV 
  
27 
66% 
SWE 
  
17 
50% 
Level 4: Full disclosure 
All demanded variables 
Fulfilled variables 
Fulfilled percentage 
  
  
  
  
 
